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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



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DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY, 



OR 



A SERIES OF ARGUMENTS 



IN 



FAVOR OF THE EXISTENCE 



OF A 



SUPREME BEING. 






BY ISAAC HARRINGTON. 




HARTFORD: 

PRESS OF CASE, LOCKWOOD AND COMPANY 

1860. 



IV 3 



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Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1860, by 

ISAAC HARRINGTON, 

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the 
Southern District of New York. 



INTRODUCTION. 



In the physical sciences much accuracy has been attained. 
Mathematics have acquired the appellation of Exact Sciences, 
and all departments of science deduced from external Nature, 
have commended themselves to the respect of the world. Not 
so with the intellectual and moral. No reliableness has yet 
been attained in them. Every thing is yet in doubt and 
dispute. Not one fact has been fully settled. The world is 
divided and distracted on every point in religion and morality. 
Should it be affirmed that a God exists, very great authority 
can be adduced to contradict the assertion. Let the opposite 
be affirmed, and the authority is still more ponderable. 

Should it be alleged that the world was created, very 
respectable authority can be arrayed against it. On the con- 
trary, let it be asserted that the world was not created, but 
always existed as at present, and the opposition is still 
stronger. 

The greater portion of mankind never entertained a doubt 
that some acts are morally right, and others morally wrong ; 
but respectable authority is not wanting to dispute the prop- 
osition. It has been both learnedly and ingeniously con- 
tended, that man necessarily follows the stronger motives ; 
that for those motives he is not responsible, and has no control 
over them ; that his character is formed by circumstances — is 



lr INTRODUCTION. 

formed for him, not by him ; that " God foreordains whatever 
comes to pass," without the agency of man. All these issues 
are yet open, and have not been placed beyond the sphere of 
logical disputation. 

Should it be affirmed that man will exist beyond the grave, 
the answer is returned, that death is an eternal sleep, and that 
future existence can not be proved. Affirm that there is such 
a place or state as heaven, and it is denied ; affirm the con- 
trary, and it is also denied. Affirm that there is a hell, a 
devil, or a state of future misery, and the proposition is largely 
admitted and largely denied. That the consequences of any 
acts committed here can reach beyond the grave, is matter for 
animated and bitter dispute. Should it be contended that the 
marriage institution is proper, it can be disputed on learned 
authority. So of every proposition that can be started in the 
whole range of religious or moral disquisition. 

Now why is this so ? Is it because every moral or religious 
principle is equally true or false ? Are moral acts both right 
and wrong ? and either equally indifferent ? Are they equally 
true and equally false ; equally right and equally wrong ; 
equally useful and equally hurtful? This is impossible. Then 
why is so much confusion permitted to distract and bewilder 
the human intellect ? What has occasioned this dreadful per- 
plexity ? Is it true that not one fact is yet settled beyond dis- 
pute in the whole range of morals ? Yes, it is really so ; and it 
is equally true of every idea that the human intellect has ever 
conceived. What has logic settled ? What has it really 
demonstrated beyond the power of. disputation ? Has it 
demonstrated that any thing can be proved ? Has it demon- 
strated that demonstration is possible — that any one exists to 
demonstrate — that any one exists to whom a demonstration 
could be made ; or that any thing exists to form a subject of 
demonstration ? Can logic prove that logic exists ? No ; all 



INTRODUCTION. V 

these things are acknowledged to be hopeless. Is there no 
remedy ? Is this uncertainty always to continue ? If so, where 
is human progress ? Where the fondly anticipated and fondly 
hoped-for day of deliverance ? How were these difficulties 
surmounted in the physical sciences ? How did mathematical 
truths arise to the reputation of " Exact Sciences ?" Simply 
by adopting a set of " axioms." But for these axioms, 
mathematical demonstrations would be as unreliable as meta- 
physical ; and it becomes of the gravest importance to inquire 
if mathematical axioms are any more reliable than meta- 
physical. Can we not form a set of metaphysical axioms, that 
will inspire the same confidence, and lead to as reliable results, 
as the mathematical truths which lead to exact science ? If 
so, the demonstrable principle may be applied to metaphysics 
with reliable results, and dispel. much of the darkness and 
gloom which now rest on all moral subjects. 

One of the mathematical axioms is the following : 

Part of a thing is less than the whole. 

But this is true only by virtue of the antecedent axiom, 

that SOMETHING EXISTS. 

If this axiom is not true, mathematics falls to the ground. 
Neither the part nor the whole of a thing exists, and all science 
is false. 

What gives the mathematician confidence that when he has 
made a demonstration, and brought out a result, that the 
same process will again produce the same result ? Simply his 
confidence in the fidelity of cause and effect. Take away the 
immutable relation between causes and effects, and all confi- 
dence must cease in any of the operations of Nature. The 
physical sciences would be destroyed, and all philosojfcy must 
cease; mathematics would be untrue, and all that is now 
received as truth would be destroyed. Then, on the authority 
of mathematics, we have the axiom that, 



VI INTRODUCTION. 

There is such a relation as cause and effect. 

Why does the mathematician accept the proposition, that the 
three angles of a triangle equal two right angles ? and reject 
the proposition that all the angles of a triangle equal four 
right angles ? Simply his confidence in the principle of right 
and wrong. What object would any one have in attempting 
to prove that there is no such thing as right and wrong ? 
Simply to show that he was right and his fellow wrong. Then, 
on the authority of mathematics, we have the antecedent axiom, 
that there is such a thing as " right and wrong." 

Has not a mathematician as clear evidence that he can 
divide a thing into parts, as he has that si the sum of the parts 
equals the whole ?" Can he have any more confidence that 
" if equals be added to equals the wholes will be equal," than 
he has in the freedom of his own acts ? Is not the freedom of 
his own will as clear to him as any axiom that he is capable of 
knowing ? If the freedom of the will is rejected from the list 
of axioms, there is no axiom that may not be rejected on the 
same account. 

If a mathematician can know that the less can not contain 
the greater, does he not know also that the less can not pro- 
duce the greater ; the less can not exceed the greater ; the 
less can not control the greater ; the less can not destroy the 
greater. No laws of existence ; no properties of bodies ; no 
relations of things can be more clearly addressed to the human 
comprehension, than the fact that — . _ 

The producer is greater than the thing produced. That also 
which destroys is greater than that whioh is destroyed. Thus 
the list of moral axioms may be extended to thousands. 

Intuij^on is the great source of knowledge. Without it, 
ecience can never get a basis. With it, ail is clear and definite. 
It is certainly as true in moral and intellectual, as it is in 
mathematical science. 






DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY, 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 

Consciousness is that by which we know. 

Should any one ask what evidence we have that 
we exist, the answer must be that we know it. 
Should we be asked how we know that, or any other 
fact, all we can say, is that we are simply conscious 
of it. 

Should we be asked how we know that the sun 
shines, we must say, that we are conscious that we 
have seen it. Should we be asked how we know 
that Columbus discovered America, our reply must 
be, that we are conscious that we have been told 
so. The only evidence we have of the fact, that 
two sides of a triangle are greater than the third 
side, is that we are conscious of the fact, that we 
have passed through a process which shows that it 
is so. 

Thus it is evident, that consciousness is the only 
means of knowing even mathematical truths. The 



8 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

exact sciences prove nothing till we admit the 
truthfulness of consciousness. A mathematical 
demonstration proves nothing, till we are conscious 
of the fact that we exist ; that our proposition ex- 
ists ; that we have reasoned ; and have passed through 
a process of thought, conducted according to cer- 
tain laws ; that we have remembered the whole pro- 
cess ; and that we have regularly drawn our con- 
clusion from the premises, according to the laws of 
mathematics. Until all this is admitted, on the 
simple dictates of consciousness, mathematics prove 
nothing, and cannot be considered truthful. 

A popular opinion prevails, to a very mischievous 
extent, that reasoning is the only means of know- 
ing. All science is imbued with this spirit, and 
though it is not directly affirmed in science, yet it 
is uniformly implied, and made the basis of all 
philosophizing. Even those who have admitted the 
reliableness of consciousness, have still made rea- 
soning the test of consciousness ; thus implying 
the false axiom, that reasoning is the most reliable 
source of knowledge. 

Reasoning proves nothing, till we are conscious 
that we exist, that we can think, that we can com- 
pare things by means of known laws, and draw 
correct conclusions from premises known to be true 
without reasoning. Consciousness is the final court 
of appeal. Suppose a man chooses to doubt his 



CONSCIOUSNESS. \j 

own existence, and to plant himself on the propo- 
sition, that every thing requires proof. Let him 
try to prove his own existence. He must do it by 
reasoning ; but he cannot reason till he first exists. 
Therefore he must admit the existence, before he 
begins the reasoning. This fact is indispensible to 
the validity of the proof. Take this away, and the 
proof means nothing ; or let this be in doubt, and 
the whole proof is without foundation, and void. 
Therefore a man in trying to prove his own exist- 
ence, assumes it in the premises, and cannot prove 
it in the conclusion. He cannot make it any part 
of the conclusion, because the conclusion must not 
be involved in the premises. 

Suppose a man wishes to prove the fact of his 
thinking. How will he do it % He must do it by 
reasoning. But he cannot reason without thinking, 
and thinking is the thing to be proved. Therefore 
the fact of thinking must be admitted, before the 
proof can begin ; and the conclusion must be as- 
sumed in the premises ; and therefore it cannot 
be made the conclusion. It is hopeless therefore 
to attempt to prove it. 

Should a man attempt to prove the fact of his 
own memory, he must not assume the point in dis- 
pute ; and therefore he must not use his memory 
till he has proved its existence. How will he prove 
it I If he does not use his memory he can have 



10 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

but one object in his mind at once. Let that object 
be memory, the thing to be proved. Then he can 
have nothing in the mind, at the same time, to prove 
it with. On the contrary, if he has any thing in 
his mind to prove it with, he cannot have memory 
in his mind, at the same time, to be proved. 

Consequently, as soon as he has something in his 
mind to be proved, he can have nothing in his mind 
to prove it with ; and as soon as he has something 
to prove it with, he has nothing to be proved. 
Therefore the existence of the human memory, must 
rest on the evidences of consciousness, without any 
hope of proof. 

If we attempt to prove the freedom of the will, 
we must lay the will aside till we make the proof. 
But we cannot make the proof without reasoning, 
and we cannot reason, till we will to reason ; there- 
fore the proof is forever beyond our reach. We 
cannot reason at all, till we admit the declarations 
of our consciousness that the will is free. 

We assume the freedom of the will, the moment 
we begin to reason ; and therefore it cannot be 
proved. Neither can it be disproved for the same 
reason. We cannot disprove it till we will to do 
so ; therefore we must assume the freedom of the 
will, before we can deny, or attempt to disprove the 
fact. 

The existence of such a thing as a law, defies all 






CONSCIOUSNESS. 11 

human proof. We cannot reason without laws. 
Our only means of proving is to appeal to some law 
of science or of thought. Before we begin to reason, 
we must admit the reliableness of the laws employ- 
ed in the process ; and therefore the point to be 
proved must be known and admitted before reason- 
ing is of any value. Consciousness alone can 
inform us that there is such an entity as law. 

We shall find ourselves in the same difficulty, if 
we attempt to prove the existence of such a thing 
as cause and effect. To prove a thing is to produce 
an effect. Therefore we cannot attempt to reason 
without attempting to produce an effect ; and there- 
fore we cannot prove, that there is any such thing 
as cause and effect ; because we must assume that 
relation of things, before we begin the proof. 

We cannot prove that there is any such thing as 
truth or falsehood, because we must know that 
there is such a relation of things, before our proof 
amounts to any thing. All proof is derived from 
fixed laws, which must be known to be true, or we 
could not know whether a point were proved or 
not. The very fact of proof presupposes a knowl- 
edge of the laws on which the proof is based. 

No man can prove that he derives any happiness 
from the exercise of benevolence. He feels the 
sweet emotions running through his soul, and there 
the matter ends. 



12 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

We cannot prove that sweet melodies of music 
awaken emotions of delight. We feel it, and those 
who have also felt it, may know how to sympathize 
with us ; but to those whose souls do not respond 
to music, we can impart no proof by logic. 

The Christian cannot prove that he feels a joy 
which surpasses all that philosophy can explain, or 
that the imagination can paint, or eloquence unfold. 
He feels the sweet consciousness of it, raising him 
higher in the scale of happiness, and extending his 
perceptions into regions of 

< ' Permanent delight — 
Full above measure." 

But those who have not felt it, must forever re- 
main ignorant of its happifying power. 

The principal sources of human happiness are 
those which consciousness alone reveals to us, in- 
dependently of the powers of logical demonstra- 
tion. 

The extreme absurdity of attempting to verify 
consciousness by reasoning, will be apparent if we 
make the attempt. 

In the first place, we must lay aside all the ob- 
jects of consciousness. We must not use them in 
our proof; because their reliableness is the point 
in dispute ; and if we use them, we cannot tell 
whether our proof is correct or not. We must 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 13 

not use doubtful facts in our proof, or the proof 
itself must be doubtful. 

We must lay aside every thing that rests on our 
consciousness. We must reject our own existence, 
the evidence of our senses, the freedom of the will, 
the exercise of reason, thought, memory, and all 
the first truths in reasoning. We must reject the 
relation of cause and effect, and right and wrong. 
We -must not be conscious of any thing. We must 
suspend all that we know, and then attempt to 
construct an argument. What can we do? Of 
course nothing. We could no more test the truth- 
fulness of any thing than a tree or a rock. 

And yet philosophers will tell us that we are 
bound to prove our own existence, the existence of 
such a thing as cause and effect, of right and 
wrong, the existence of the external world, etc. 
The wisdom and learning of the world have been 
expended on the freedom of the will, which is af- 
firmed by simple consciousness ; and, therefore, all 
that can be written to try to verify it, must proceed 
in a circle. 

Every man is conscious of existence. Now, 
suppose we appeal to reasoning to know whether 
this declaration of consciousness is correct. Let 
our reasoning bring us to the conclusion that Ave do 
not exist. Would any man accept and act upon 
this deduction of reasoning ? No ; every one 
2 



14 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

would still be conscious of existence, -would act 
accordingly, and would refuse to act on any other 
supposition. The business of life would still go 
on, and no one would perceive that the world had 
lost a particle of confidence in the declarations 
of consciousness. It is evident, therefore, that 
men confide in the teachings of consciousness more 
strongly than they do in the deductions of their 
ow T n reasoning. 

Consciousness is a necessary prerequisite, or an- 
tecedent to reasoning. We cannot reason till we 
are conscious that we exist, that we think, that we 
have facts to reason with, and subjects to reason 
upon. All these things must be antecedent to 
reasoning ; and from them, reasoning derives all its 
authority. Take them away, and reasoning would 
prove nothing. But if we attempt to prove the 
reliableness of consciousness by reasoning, we must 
take these away, till we can prove them by reason- 
ing; otherwise we shall assume the point to be 
proved. 

Now reason is in an awkward predicament. She 
cannot begin to reason without consciousness, and 
she cannot have consciousness, till she can begin 
to reason, and prove consciousness and its truth- 
fulness. What will she do? Can she ever sur- 
mount this difficulty ? She cannot. She is eter- 
nally at rest, till she will proceed on the authority 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 15 

of consciousness, and cavil no more. She must 
make an entire surrender, and be content with the 
conditions. Should she, like a fickle child, grow 
petulant and troublesome again, she will be at once 
arrested in the midst of her most daring enter- 
prises, and held in bonds till she learns her weak- 
ness. 

Therefore reasoning is forever arrested in her 
progress, till she confides in the superior authority 
of consciousness. 

Now, since reasoning depends on consciousness, 
it cannot be applied as a test to consciousness ; be- 
cause that would be making consciousness depend 
on reasoning, instead of reasoning on conscious- 
ness ; and, since reasoning derives its authority from 
consciousness, it cannot be applied as a test to 
consciousness ; because that would make conscious- 
ness a test of itself, which is absurd. 

To make reasoning prove or disprove conscious- 
ness, would be to make consciousness prove or dis- 
prove itself. Consciousness would become the 
prover, the proof, and the thing to be proved ; be- 
cause all would depend upon it as a foundation. 
Now r if reasoning could disprove the existence of 
consciousness, and consciousness could be taken 
away, or be out of existence, as the thing dis- 
proved, it would still exist as the prover and the 
proof, and would be out of existence in one form, 



16 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

and would still be in existence in two forms, which 
is ridiculous and absurd. 

It is evident that the teachings of consciousness 
must be confided in before reasoning can begin; 
therefore they cannot be established by reasoning ; 
and if they could be established by reasoning with- 
out the aid of consciousness, we could not know it ; 
and therefore we should be obliged to prove that 
we had reasoned ; we should be obliged to prove 
our proof, and prove that we had proved the point 
in dispute ; all of which would be impossible with- 
out the sanction of consciousness. It is therefore 
impossible to apply reasoning as a test to con- 
sciousness, until we can reason independently of 
consciousness ; and therefore reason without being 
conscious that we exist, or that any thing else 
exists ; that we reason, or that any one else rea- 
sons. 

In order to prove or disprove the authority of 
consciousness, we must be unconscious at the time, 
and must not let consciousness be in any way ne- 
cessary to the proof ; but in order to know that we 
had proved any thing, we must be conscious of 
what we had done. 

Therefore we can neither prove nor disprove the 
authority of consciousness, till we can be uncon- 
scious of existence, and yet conscious of it ; un- 
conscious of the teachings of consciousness, and 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 17 

yet conscious of them ; unconscious of the proof 
of the truthfulness or untruthfulness of conscious- 
ness, and yet conscious of it, which is absurd. 

Therefore it is impossible for reasoning to be 
employed as a test of consciousness. But con- 
sciousness is the only test of reasoning; because 
we cannot judge whether an argument is correctly 
conducted or not, nor whether the conclusion is 
correctly drawn from the promises or not, without 
our consciousness. Now, since consciousness is 
the test of reasoning, it follows that reasoning can- 
not be the test of consciousness. 

We have also seen, that should reasoning lead 
to the conclusion that we do not exist, and that 
consciousness is fallacious, no one would believe the 
deductions of his ow T n reasoning. The conscious- 
ness of his own existence could not be overruled. 
The active currents of life would still flow on. 
The lamp of life would still burn. The ocean of 
thought would heave with restless commotion. 
Consciousness would whisper into the ear of being, 
and the devotee at the shrine of reasoning, after 
he had confessed his nonentity, would rise up and 
affirm — " I still exist." 

Hence, in every aspect of the case, it is impos- 
sible to make reasoning a test of consciousness. 
The almost universal practice, therefore, of making 
reason the test of every thing, is evidently absurd. 



18 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

Hence the vast amount of ingenious effort that 
has been expended in trying to verify the teachings 
of consciousness, has been worse than lost. It has 
unsettled every fact known to man. There is not 
one fact in literature, art, or science that has yet 
been settled by reasoning. Every thing is open 
for discussion. Philosophers have taught us to 
demand proof of our own existence, of the exist- 
ence of the external universe, of the existence of 
such a thing as cause and effect, of right and 
wrong, and all the truths on which human knowl- 
edge depends. 

Philosophers have entirely overlooked the fact, 
that it is beyond the power of reason ever to settle 
one fact. We have shown that reasoning cannot 
confirm the truthfulness of consciousness, and of 
course, it cannot confirm any thing else ; because 
every thing else depends on consciousness. Hith- 
erto we have found ourselves wandering amazed in 
a universe of unknown, disputed, and disputable 
things, either real or imaginary, and unable to find 
a solid and settled point on which to erect a stand- 
ard by which to test any thing. By reasoning 
alone, the human family have never had one thing 
in common, except the uncertainty of every thing. 

Now, why is it so ? Is it because the universe 
is an ignis fatuus, and reason a bright luminary. 

" Which leads to bewilder, and dazzles to blind ?" 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 19 

No ; it is because reason has been wrested from 
its true office, and been amused, like the infant 
and unpracticed spectator, on first looking up to 
the brilliant host of worlds on high. It holds up 
its little hands to catch the stars, thinking them 
quite within its reach. 

For the ten thousandth time, consciousness has 
been arraigned at the bar of reasoning, and requir- 
ed to give an account of the rectitude of her doings. 
She has been obliged to face the most powerful ar- 
ray of counsel, headed by Des Cartes, and backed 
up by the most profound learning, and the most in- 
genious logic that the world could furnish ; but she 
has found herself quite equal to the occasion. She 
has never yet been compelled to lower her dignity, 
by acknowledging accountability at the bar of 
reasoning. She is the rightful sovereign of the 
realm of thought, seated on an eminence too high 
for genius to ascend, and too firm for logic to dis- 
turb. 

With what success her authority has been dis- 
puted, we shall see. Among the first and foremost 
of her opponents, we may mention Des Cartes. 
Being disgusted with the looseness of the philoso- 
phy of his times, he took the opposite extreme, 
and resolved to discredit his own existence, till he 
could confirm it by reasoning. He was unwilling 
to trust his consciousness, and therefore resolved to 



£0 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

establish bis existence by the force of logic. In 
searching for proof he found nothing which ap- 
peared to him entirely free from doubt, except the 
fact that HE THOUGHT. 

Delighted with the idea that he had found a re- 
liable foundation on which to build, he constructed 
the argument, " Cogito ergo sum." "I think, 
therefore, I am." He thought he had proved 
his own existence, from the fact that he thought ; 
and he made this the foundation of his philosophy. 
It is a little surprising, however, that he did not 
discover, that the conclusion of his argument was 
assumed in the premises. When he had said, 
" I think," he had presupposed the proposition, 
" / am." If I affirm that I think, I do not prove 
that I am, as a necessary consequent ; but I as- 
sume or presuppose that I am, as a necessary 
antecedent, without which the proposition, " I 
think," cannot be true. If he had said, J do not 
think, he would have assumed the proposition, I 
am, as the only condition on which he could say, I 
do not think. The act of speaking or acting at all, 
presupposes the existence of the person who speaks 
or acts. The argument of Des Cartes amounts to 
this, " I am, therefore I am," which is ridic- 
ulous and absurd. 

But how did he know that he thought? Simply 
by his consciousness. Then he assumed the teach- 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 21 

ings of consciousness to be reliable, and made that 
fact the foundation of his proof. But that was 
the point he set out to prove. Therefore he as- 
sumed the point to be proved, and made that as- 
sumption the foundation of his philosophy. 

Lest we should be thought to draw our conclu- 
sions unfairly, we beg that the reader may notice, 
that the proposition, I think , is without meaning, 
unless the subject I represents some person who 
thinks, and the predicate think is affirmed of some 
person who thinks. The existence of this person 
must be known before the affirmation can be made, 
that he thinks. Des Cartes, therefore, could not 
have truthfully affirmed, a I think, " unless he pre- 
viously knew his own existence. When he said, 
" I think, therefore I am" he ended exactly 
where he began. He began and ended with the 
fact of his own existence, and this he received on 
the authority of consciousness, which is the thing 
he resolved not to do. 

He therefore made consciousness the foundation 
of his philosophy, while he professed to build upon 
proof. 

Why did that deep and acute philosopher fall 
into such a mistake ? It was the unavoidable re- 
sult of the false axiom on which he attempted to 
build, that nothing must be received without 
proof It was an unavoidable result ; because 



22 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

the moment he attempted to prove his own exist- 
ence, he assumed it ; and he finally built on con- 
sciousness, because that is the only foundation on 
which he could build. He who attempts to avoid 
it, will find himself planted upon it, the moment he 
begins to think, speak, or act. The teachings of 
consciousness are the only reliable things known to 
man — the only foundation on which we can build, 
even if we attempt to reject it. It is, indeed, the 

only FOUNDATION. 

If any differ from us in adopting this foundation, 
we ask him to take any other, and risk the conse- 
quences. What will he do ? 

He cannot think a thought, speak a word, per- 
form an act, nor recognize his own existence, nor 
that of any person or any thing else. He cannot 
eat nor drink, can neither affirm a thing nor deny 
it, admit, assume, nor attempt to prove. He must 
consent to be a nonentity — must not be at all. 
His very existence will be a standing refutation of 
his theory. 

He cannot be allowed to assume his conscious- 
ness, and to act upon it ; and make that the only 
means of doubting it, as has universally been the 
case with those who have distrusted their conscious- 
ness. But the doubter may say, as objectors are 
fond of saying, that he is on the negative, and it 
devolves on the affirmative to make the proof. But 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 23 

he must recollect, that in the absence of conscious- 
ness, there is neither affirmative nor negative. If 
there is such a relation of things, and if it is a 
settled rule of logic, that the affirmative is bound 
to make the proof, it follows that the point in dis- 
pute is admitted; because these distinctions can 
exist only among conscious beings, who have a very 
considerable knowledge of men and things, and of 
the rules of logic, and the settled principles of 
science ; all of which must be kept out of sight, till 
the truthfulness of consciousness is settled. 

He cannot throw the burden of proof on his 
opponent, because neither he nor his opponent yet 
exists, as far as the argument is concerned. Their 
very existence is involved in the question, and must 
not be assumed. Let no one flatter himself that 
we are anxious to persuade him to adopt the plat- 
form which we have laid down. We ask him, 
rather, to reject it if he can. We cannot conceive 
how an objector can exist ; because the moment 
the reliableness of consciousness is denied, it is ad- 
mitted ; and therefore the objector is instantly con- 
verted into a defender of our platform. Therefore 
an opponent can never be found. Professed oppo- 
nents are the best defenders of what we contend for. 

It is sufficiently demonstrated that the veracitj 
of consciousness is a truth which cannot be proved, 
denied, nor questioned. 



24 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

It is an astonishing fact, that in any conceivable 
mode of proof, the conclusion would be assumed 
in the premises. 

No one can reason on the subject without admit- 
ting to himself the proposition, I reason. But 
we cannot reason without thinking ; therefore the 
admission, I reason, is an admission of the propo- 
sition, I think, which is the elementary proposition 
of Des Cartes. 

His argument is, therefore, the only one that 
could have been adopted, since every other is but a 
different form of his, and may be reduced to it. 
Hence we cannot reason at all on the truthfulness 
of consciousness, without beginning with the pro- 
position, I think. But we have seen that the pro- 
position, I think, assumes the proposition, I am, 
which is the point in dispute. Therefore any pos- 
sible mode of inquiry into the truthfulness of con- 
sciousness must assume the conclusion in the prem- 
ises. 

It is one of the greatest evidences of the agency 
of a great intelligence in the orderly structure of 
the universe, that the foundations of human knowl- 
edge, deep laid in our consciousness, are so wisely 
presented to the understanding, and are so effect- 
ually guarded against unbelief, that we cannot 
openly deny, nor silently disbelieve, nor secretly 
doubt the teachings of consciousness, without as- 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 25 

saining the point that our foolish pride of intellect 
would call in question. 

If any man denies, he admits the proposition, 
" / deny." If he disbelieves, he admits the pro- 
position, " I disbelieve ." If he doubts, he admits 
the proposition, " I doubt." But in all these 
propositions the subject I assumes the existence of 
some person who denies, disbelieves, or doubts. 
Therefore we cannot deny, disbelieve, nor doubt 
the verity of consciousness, without assuming the 
point in debate. 

We have now seen that the teachings of con- 
sciousness can neither be proved nor disproved, 
affirmed nor denied, doubted nor believed, admit- 
ted nor rejected. 

We cannot prove them, without a conscious and 
antecedent agent to prove them. We cannot dis- 
prove them, without a conscious and antecedent 
agent to disprove them. And could that agent 
disprove them, and show that they do not exist, 
or that no reliance can be placed upon them ; this 
conscious being must rely on his consciousness for 
the reliableness of his reasoning, and must therefore 
rely on what he had disproved. 

After consciousness and its teachings had been 

reasoned out of existence, the being that performed 

the wonderful feat would still exist, and would 

possess and trust his consciousness ; and therefore 

3 



26 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

consciousness must exist, and not exist at the same 
time, which is absurd. 

Who would not laugh at the folly of a mad man 
who should light a lamp, and, with the lamp in 
hand, should search for the non-existence of the 
lamp ; and after he had found that the lamp did 
not exist, should confirm the non-existence of the 
lamp, by the light of the lamp. But is not this 
precisely the case with the philosopher, who, by 
the light of consciousness, attempts to discredit 
the teachings of consciousness % The point can 
neither be proved nor disproved, affirmed nor de- 
nied, admitted nor rejected, believed nor doubted, 
without first assuming a conscious being, who shall 
take the light of consciousness into his hand, be- 
fore he can perform any act whatever. 

The final sum is this : any proposition whicn 
can possibly be formed must assume the truthful- 
ness of consciousness in the subject ; therefore it 
cannot become the predicate ; consequently all rea- 
soning on the subject must proceed in a circle. 

The premises of an argument or proposition 
necessarily include the teachings of consciousness 
as the conditions on which they are correct ; and 
therefore to try to bring them into the conclusion 
or predicate, is an absurdity which would require 
but little notice, had it not become so common. . 

The teachings of consciousness can be neither 



THE SENSES. 27 

proved nor disproved, affirmed nor denied, doubted 
nor believed, admitted nor rejected. 

They must be let alone, and simply obeyed. Its 
voice is our law. It stands forth an immutable, 
incomprehensible, eternal source of truth, -which 
we can never fathom. 



THE SENSES. 



The senses are the instruments by which we per^ 
ceive external objects. 

By the senses, we mean Seeing, Hearing, Tast- 
ing, Smelling and Feeling. 

The existence of our senses cannot be proved. 
We have no means of conveying ideas but by lan- 
guage ; and language is wholly derived from objects 
of sense. Therefore the objects of sense are neces- 
sarily involved in the premises of every argument ; 
and cannot belong to the conclusion. We cannot 
construct a sentence in any language, without ad- 
mitting the objects of sense. But in recognizing 
the objects of sense, we recognize the senses them- 
selves. Therefore the existence of the senses, is 
an element in the premises of every argument ; and 
cannot be made the conclusion. Hence the exist 



28 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

ence of the senses cannot be proved without assum- 
ing it in the proof. 

But the existence of the senses is a fact which 
does not need proof; because, 

1. We are conscious of their existence, and 
consciousness is more reliable than proof. There- 
fore the existence of the senses is more reliable than 
it would be if we could merely prove it. 

2. The fact is necessarily admitted by all men ; 
therefore proof would be gratuitous and super- 
fluous. 

RELIABLENESS OF THE SENSES. 

All philosophers admit the existence of the senses, 
and also the reliableness of their teachings, so 
far as ideas are concerned. No one denies that we 
have the idea of external objects ; but that any 
thing more than the idea exists, is a fact which, 
in the opinion of modern philosophers, requires 
proof. Hence much ingenious effort has been 
expended in trying to demonstrate this difficult 
problem. 

If the existence of external objects requires proof, 
they must not be used, until the proof is made ; 
otherwise the point in dispute will be assumed. If 
philosophers attempt to prove that the earth exists ; 
they must not have it to stand upon till they prove 



THE SENSES. 29 

its existence. They must not have the air to 
breathe, food to eat, nor water to drink ; otherwise 
they will assume the point in dispute, which is not 
allowable. 

Yet all these things are necessarily recognized, 
before any process of proof can begin. Their exist- 
ence is a necessary element in the subject of every 
proposition that can be formed in any language ; 
and therefore cannot be the predicate. It is there- 
fore absurd to try to prove this proposition ; because 
the point to be proved, is necessarily assumed in 
the premises. 

Philosaphers seem to think, that if they can 
puke and drule for a time in the nursery — be fed 
and clothed — protected from danger — and be fur- 
nished with every thing needful in the defenseless 
hours of infancy : if they can be sent to the pri- 
mary school, and taught in the elements of learn- 
ing — be sent to a grammar school, and be patiently 
taught in their academical studies— can be sent to 
a university and supported there, till they acquaint 
themselves with science, literature, and arts : if 
they can assume all these, as antecedents ; they 
can then sit down and coolly demand proof, that 
any such things ever existed. 

Greater folly and absurdity could not be in- 
dulged. 

How can a philosopher respect the command- 



30 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY, 

ment — " Honor thy father and thy mother ;" if 
he demands proof that they ever existed ? 

It may be said perhaps, that philosophers may 
assume and employ the idea of external objects, 
without assuming the objects themselves. But 
they are not at liberty to use even the idea of these 
things. While making the proof, they are bound 
to have the idea of not having, and using external 
objects. 

They must have the idea of not having had 
father nor mother nor home — of not having been fed 
and clothed — of not having been taught and guided 
through childhood and youth. They are bound to 
have the idea, that external objects have not been 
used, while they were proving their existence. 

It is obvious that the reliableness of the senses, 
cannot be proved ; because the objects of sensation 
must be employed in making the proof. Therefore 
the point to be proved, would necessarily be as- 
sumed in the subject or premises ; and could not 
be made the predicate of a proposition. 

But the existence of external objects is a pro- 
position which does not demand proof, because, 

1. It is a fact that all men admit. They 
cannot live a single hour, or minute, without ad- 
mitting it ; and therefore to attempt to prove it, 
would be gratuitous. 

2. The existence of things cannot be denied; 



THE SENSES. 31 

because the very proposition which denied it would 
admit it. 

We have now shown that the existence of ex- 
ternal objects is necessarily admitted in the prem- 
ises of every argument. 

The words of all languages are the representa- 
tives of external objects ; 

Therefore a proposition which denied the exist- 
ence of external objects, would admit the thing 
denied. 

We have now seen, that the existence of the 
external universe, cannot be proved ; because it is 
always admitted, even when denied. We cannot 
formally admit the fact, without involving a double 
admission ; because the admission would be involved 
in both the premises and the conclusion. 

It is therefore a proposition which cannot be 
proved nor disproved ; admitted nor denied ; re- 
ceived nor rejected. 

It must be let alone as a truth antecedent to, 
and independent of reasoning. 

It is a truth forever secure against the attacks 
of skepticism. It cannot be denied nor doubted 
without recognizing words ; and consequently ex- 
ternal objects. The objector cannot demand proof 
of any one else, because any one else would be an 
external object, the existence of which is the point 
to be proved. 



32 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

There is no reason why this perplexing proposi- 
tion should be any longer considered an open ques- 
tion. Any one who denies it, or demands proof of 
it, can instantly be convicted of inconsistency, by 
showing that he admits it. 

If he demands proof of it, he admits it in two 
ways : 

1. By using words derived from external objects. 

2. By admitting the existence of a person exter- 
nal to himself to whom he is speaking. 

The existence of the external world is a neces- 
sary antecedent to all reasoning. Without it, 
reasoning cannot begin. 

Therefore the existence of the senses, and the 
reliableness of their teaching are : 

1. Antecedent to reasoning. 

2. Are necessarily admitted in all processes of 
reasoning. 

3. Reasoning is void without them. 

4. Men confide in them even though their rea- 
soning should reject them. 

5. They cannot be proved nor disproved ; affirm- 
ed nor denied ; doubted nor believed ; admitted nor 
rejected by any form of logical reasoning, without 
assuming the point in dispute ; 

6. Therefore the senses are more reliable than 
any thing that depends on proof. 



REASONING. 83 



REASONING. 

Having shown that consciousness is antecedent 
to reasoning, and that reasoning cannot begin till 
the verity of consciousness is admitted ; we now 
proceed to notice the nature and extent of rea- 
soning. 

The foundations of reasoning have ever been in- 
volved in vagueness and doubt. Philosophers have 
been aware that the starting points of their reason- 
ing, eluded the powers of logic; and baffled all 
attempts at demonstration. Writers of every 
school have felt this difficulty, and have long been 
striving to surmount it. Some, on finding that 
they could not demonstrate their first truths, have 
hesitated whether to 

" Trust in every thing or doubt of all." 

Others have attempted to prove them, and after 
committing themselves to the necessity of proving 
them, have failed, and then assumed them in viola- 
tion of their own admission. 

The attempt has been made to shun the diffi- 
culty by rejecting substantial forms, and denying 
the existence of every thing except ideas ; but this 



84 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

does not remove the obstacles from our path. 
There is quite as much difficulty in proving the ex- 
istence of immaterial things, as material things. 
We can no more prove the existence of ideas, than 
we can the existence of material forms. Therefore 
we cannot reject the one, without rejecting the 
other. 

Reid has endeavored to surmount the obstacle 
by insisting on his rule of common sense ; but he 
has asserted and denounced, where he should have 
reasoned. An opponent is entitled to a reason, 
rather than an odious epithet. He argues very 
properly, that first truths do not require proof; 
but he asserts this fact without proving it. If we 
cannot prove them ; we can prove that they can- 
not and need not be proved. 

Reid denounces as mad men, those who deny the 
evidence of their consciousness and sensation ; and 
says they are fit subjects for an insane hospital. 
But most philosophers have tried to prove their 
first truths ; and this fact implies the right to deny, 
till the proof is made. If it is a mark of lunacy to 
deny, it is as much so to attempt to prove ; and 
Reid's list of mad men becomes so large, that we 
should not find a hospital large enough to hold 
them. There are thousands of little neighborhood 
philosophers, who would think it an honor to be 
called even mad men, in the same category with 



REASONING. 35 

John Locke, Des Cartes, and numerous others of 
like celebrity. May it not be better to try, by 
some skillful treatment, to restore these men to 
their reason again, by giving them a good reason for 
what we assert, rather than leave them in their 
insanity ? 

It is not sufficient for us to say that we cannot 
prove our first truths, and that we are not bound to 
do so. What we cannot do, perhaps some one 
else can ; unless it is shown that these truths lie 
beyond the reach of human reasoning ; and cannot 
be proved by any means. But Reid falls so far 
short of this, that he leaves them nearly as open as 
before. He says, " Such common principles seldom 
admit of direct proof. 5 ' Now what are we to under- 
stand by the assertion, that they seldom admit of 
direct proof. Does he mean to say, that sometimes 
they do admit of direct proof; and at other times 
they do not % And when he says, they seldom 
admit of direct proof, does he mean to imply that 
they frequently admit of indirect proof? This 
leaves them in confusion and doubt. Is it true 
that these truths can be proved in any manner; 
directly or indirectly ; seldom or frequently 1 They 
cannot. 

And if we allow that these are facts so clearly 
self-evident as not to require proof ; how are we 
to determine what kind of facts come within the 



36 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

meaning of elementary truths, and how manyl 
We need some rule to determine, otherwise we may 
plead exemption when we should prove. 

The youthful inquirer has had no standard by 
which to judge, and he has been led to believe that 
he is bound to prove every thing. 

The foundations of reasoning have not yet been 
fortified against the attacks of ingenious sophistry. 
Philosophers must hold themselves bound by more 
exact methods of investigation, or science can never 
inspire implicit confidence. Every fact known to 
man, may now be disputed on the authority of science. 

If we allege that we exist, we have the authority 
of great names to contend with. We can be re- 
minded that Des Cartes has given his sanction to 
She necessity of proving the fact of personal exist- 
ence ; and his opinion may be fortified by hundreds 
of illustrious names. If we assert the existence 
of the external world, we must confront the powers 
of Berkley, Locke, Hume, and a most proud array 
of learning and talent, allowing that this is a pro- 
position which should be proved. 

If we claim that some acts are morally right, and 
others wrong ; we are told by a large and somewhat 
celebrated school of moralists, that all things are 
right, that all things are governed by the fixed and 
invariable laws of nature, and must be right and 
pure. 



REASONING. 37 

If we raise our voice against the appalling effects 
of vice, and urge the moral causes appropriate to 
destroy the effects of wrong doing ; we may be told 
upon the very gravest authority, that it has not yet 
been shown, that there is any such relation among 
things, as cause and effect. 

If we contend that " All men are created free 
and equal," we &re told that "There is no institu- 
tion more pleasing in the sight of Heaven than do 
mestic slavery." 

When we urge the exalted precepts of Jesus 
Christ as a rule of action, we are informed that 
it is not certain that any such being ever ex 
isted. 

So we may pass through the whole range of lit- 
erature, art, science, and* indeed every fact yet 
known to man ; and every particle may be disputed 
on the authority of science. 

By science alone, man has never yet settled one 
fact. There is not yet one demonstrated truth on 
which any man can build a system of logic. Sci- 
ence has been erected without a foundation, and 
when held responsible by its own inductions, its 
deductions are unsound. 

But is science necessarily so unreliable ? Why 

has logic proved so inefficient? The difficulty 

seems to have arisen from a misconception of the 

true nature of reasoning. Philosophers have over- 

4 



88 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

looked the fact, that something must be known 

BEFORE ANY THING CAN BE PROVED. 

They have supposed that they could make logical 
proof more satisfactory than the facts from which 
their conclusions must be drawn. 

Philosophy has been greatly misled by the false 
opinion, that nothing is to be admitted without 
proof. 

This sounds well in theory, and coincides with 
the popular, and even the learned idea of the true 
system of philosophy. It may seem absurd to al 
lege, that there are things more reliable, than any 
thing that depends on proof; but however startling 
it may be, we venture the assertion, that proof is en- 
tirely subordinate to that from which it is derived 

This will be apparent when we consider, that 
reasoning is to philosophy, what chemistry is to 
solids. It is a method of decomposition, by which 
things are reduced to their elements. 

Reasoning is a species of intellectual chemistry. 
The art of decomposing thoughts, and reducing 
them to their elements, so as to ascertain the laws 
of their composition. Thoughts, like sensible 
bodies, have certain elements to which they may 
be reduced ; and beyond which the process of anal- 
ysis cannot go. An element cannot be analyzed. 
We can no more analyze an element in metaphys- 
ics, than in physics. 



REASONING. -89 

Simples must first exist, or compounds cannot 
exist. Therefore simples are necessary antece- 
dents to compounds ; and compounds cannot be 
antecedent to simples. The compounds must de- 
pend on the simples ; and therefore the simple3 
cannot depend on the compounds. 

The compounds can have no properties not con- 
tained in the simples. 

Since the simples exist antecedent to, and inde- 
pendent of compounds ; and since the compounds 
depend on the simples, it follows that the com- 
pounds cannot be admitted to exist ; nor be in any 
way used without presupposing the simples. 

Ail reasoning, therefore, presupposes the exist- 
ence of those elementary principles from which 
reasoning is derived ; and therefore reasoning can- 
not prove these elements. If they are not pre- 
supposed, the reasoning is void, and does not prove 
any thing ; and if they are presupposed as a neces- 
sary antecedent to the reasoning, they cannot be 
proved by that reasoning. 

If A is before B, then B cannot, at the same 
time, be before A. 

If A supports B, then B cannot, at the same 
time, support A. 

If A depends on B, then B cannot, at the same 
time, depend on A. 



40 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

If A proves the existence of B, then B cannot, at 
the same time, prove the existence of A. 

If B cannot be proved without A, then A must 
be known, before B can be proved. 

If A must b§ known before B can be proved, 
then B cannot be employed in the proof of A. 

These axioms show that those elementary ideas 
which are antecedent to, and which support reason- 
ing, cannot be sustained, or demonstrated by rea- 
soning. 

We can prove a thing only by reducing it to, or 
comparing it with something that is known. 

Therefore, before the first thing can be proved, 
something must be known; or nothing could be 
thus reduced or compared. 

Proof is something more simple than the thing 
proved. Therefore there must be something more 
simple than any thing that can be proved. Hence 
the thing proved cannot be the plainest thing 
known ; nor the first thing known. 

We cannot reason without something from which 
to reason. A carpenter cannot build a house with- 
out principles to work from ; tools to work with, 
and materials to work upon. Neither can a man 
reason without principles from which to reason ; 
subjects on which to reason ; and known facts with 
jwhieh to reason. Therefore known facts must be 
antecedent to reasoning , must sustain all rea- 



REASONING. 41 



soning; and therefore cannot be proved by rea- 



soning, 



These facts must be sufficiently ample, to con- 
tain the elements of all that is afterward to be 
proved ; because every thing subsequently proved, 
must be regularly deduced from these as ante- 
cedents.; 

These antecedents must not be based on specu- 
lation ; or all that flows from them will rest on 
speculation. 

They must not depend on probability, or all that 
is drawn from them can be merely probable, and 
no fact could ever rise higher than probability. 

They must be known, or nothing drawn from 
them could ever be known ; and no fact could arise 
to the standard of actual knowledge. 

We have here laid down a basis for reasoning ; 
and consequences so momentous depend on the ele- 
mentary principles on which we build our super- 
structure ; that every particle of the foundations 
should be rigidly inspected. 

Should this basis be received, it must forever 
settle all the controversies about first truths. 

If our main proposition is not true ; that some- 
thing MUST BE KNOWN BEFORE ANY THING CAN 

be proved ; then let the opposite be true ; that 
something must be proved, before any thing can be 
known. Let us ascend the stream of time to its 



42 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

source ; and take our stand at that period, when 
the intellectual domain was as uncultivated as an 
unbroken forest — when no fact had been proved, 
and nothing of course w T as known. When man had 
not a single idea ; or, if he had any at all, they 
were unknown, and therefore untrue. 

At this point, let us begin to reason. Having 
no known facts to begin with, we must begin with 
unknown facts ; and w T e must put unknown facts 
enough together, to make know^n facts. 

Now the question naturally suggests itself ; how 
many unknown facts, will make one known thing ? 
Probably about as many as it would take ciphers 
to make a unit. The thing is impossible. 

Should we pass through a train of reasoning, 
using all the time unknown facts, and bring out a 
conclusion ; that conclusion would be unknown. 
It is a rule in logic, that no part of the argument 
must be assumed ; but in this case every part 
would be assumed, and therefore, the proof would 
be worthless. Therefore it is obvious that nothing 
can be proved, till we have known facts with which 
to make our first proof. 

We may be asked if we do not assume some- 
thing, in saying that something must be known, 
before any thing can be proved. 

But, it must be recollected, that something must 



REASONING, 43 

not only be assumed, but it must be known ; or 
nothing can ever be # found out by reasoning. 

It must not only be considered probable, but it 
must be known, beyond all doubt, probability, or 
assumption. 

Now one known thing is no more assumed than 
another. If my consciousness tells me one thing, 
and my reasoning another thing, the one is no 
more assumed than the other ; because both de- 
pend on the affirmations of consciousness. 

Therefore it follows that all first or elementary 
ideas are known truths. 

It now becomes important to know what is prop- 
erly a first or elementary truth, and to this subject 
we now invite special attention. 

FIRST TRUTHS. 

A first truth is one that cannot be proved nor 
disproved on any other evidence than the simple 
affirmations of consciousness.* A first truth may 
be known by the following characteristics : 

1. In any attempt to prove a first truth; the 
conclusion will be assumed in the premises. 

* Although sensation conveys ideas to our consciousness , 
we cannot say that sensation reveals to us a first truth. Until 
the consciousness makes the affirmation, no idea is conceived 
by the mind. Consciousness is the only means of knowing. 



44 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

2. In any attempt to disprove a first truth ; its 
truthfulness becomes essential to the validity of 
the proof. 

The difficulty of either proving or disproving a 
first truth, arises from the fact, that man is finite. 
He cannot comprehend the whole chain of being ; 
there must, somewhere, be a limit to his intelli- 
gence. It matters not, how far back he may go ; 
after he has traced the chain of cause and effect 
back to the last link within his comprehension; the 
next link farther back must be out of sight. The 
last link which he can comprehend, is a first truth ; 
and the only reason why he cannot prove its truth- 
fulness, is that the proof requires a knowledge of 
the link on which it depends ; and that is out of 
sight. An impenetrable vail hides the immediate 
antecedents and causes from our view ; and igno- 
rance alone can prompt us to attempt impossibil- 
ities. 

Were it possible for man to transcend his present 
limits, and explain the causes of what are at pres- 
ent first truths ; he would still find himself in the 
same difficulties. 

Wherever he stopped, his last truths would de- 
pend on something still farther back, and would be 
inexplicable. The last link would be incompre- 
hensible. Its bare existence would be all that he 
could know about it. He could not explain the 



REASONING. 45 

immediate causality of that existence ; and he 
would still be perplexed and confounded with a set 
of first truths. 

He would have only exchanged one set of diffi- 
culties for another, by resolving one set of first 
truths into another. 

Therefore it is a philosophical necessity in the 
case ; and it follows that all finite beings must 
have a set of first truths which must ever triumph 
over all attempts to solve them. 

Could we go back myriads of times farther than 
we can at present ; the last facts would depend on 
something still farther back; and forever cut off 
from our inspection ; lying within the incompre- 
hensible. 

Therefore the doctrine of first truths is so far 
from being even doubtful, that there is a necessity 
in the case, that there should be such a class of 
ideas. 

He who has not reasoned back to a set of first 
truths, has not found a solid point on which he can 
rest the lever of intellectual power. He has not 
yet begun the business of reasoning ; and he who 
has reasoned back so far, and still doubts, or de- 
mands proof of his first truths, has reasoned to no 
end. 

His reasoning is without foundation, and his su- 
perstructure is a baseless edifice which stands in 



46 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

tliin air, without substance enough even to deter 
mine its own fall. 

Man is truly and emphatically a 

" Distinguished link in being's endless chain, 
Midway from nothing to the Deity." 

We can neither go backward nor foward to the 
end. 

If we go forward, we soon find ourselves involved 
in the same difficulties. The last link within our 
comprehension is the support of something still 
farther on, which we cannot explain ; and we have 
a set of last truths as difficult to be comprehended 
as our first truths. 

Now it is just as reasonable to doubt our last as 
our first truths. 

We have just as much reason to doubt all we 
know, because we cannot trace the chain of causa- 
tion forward to all eternity, as we have to doubt 
because we cannot go back to the immediate causes 
of our first truths. Yet men never doubt what 
they know because they cannot go farther forward. 

They believe as far as they can go, and are con- 
tent to stop there. Why not then, go back as far 
as we can, and be content to stop there % 

EXTENT OF FIRST TRUTHS. 

The greatest evils have resulted from the supre- 



REASONING. 47 

macy that has been given to intellect over the innate 
and subjective principles of our nature. There is 
something in man superior to mere intellect. Man 
has been mostly taught by intuition, and sensation ; 
and not by logic. It is not the result of logic, that 
we know that we love, or fear, or hate. How do 
we derive the idea of any pure enjoyment ? Cer- 
tainly not by reasoning, but by the spontaneous 
emotions of the soul. 

He who stands upon the shore of the majestic 
ocean and listens to its deep-toned thunders ; or to 
the more subdued voice of its thousand-tongued 
minstrelsy ; explores a world of thought and feel- 
ing variegated with sublimer scenery and sweeter 
prospects than logic ever dreamed of. 

He who listens to the sweet strains of eloquence, 
or like a reed bending before the blast; stands 
yielding to the overpowering strokes of native 
oratory plred by the strong arm of genius ; finds 
emotions spontaneously awakening within him, 
revealing a world unexplored by the votaries of 
logic. 

Let the poet attempt to warm his genius into fer- 
tility at the fires of logic, and he will soon find the 
deep fountains, the gentle rills, and the flowery 
vales of his soul chilled to barrenness and decay. 
His Italy will be transported to Iceland. His 
A rides will become only a shapeless eminence three 



48 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

miles high ; without form and void. Niagara Falls 
will be a convenient place for washing sheep ; and 
the Alps a serious inconvenience in the way to 
Italy. 

Should the painter draw his masterly creations 
from the simple power of logic, all their richness 
and beauty would be lost. Reasoning might con- 
struct a systematic and mechanical exterior ; but 
the deep, native resources of the incomprehensible 
principle which resides where the footsteps of logic 
never reached, must breathe into the lifeless body 
the breath of life. Life must be breathed in ? not 
reasoned in. 

We might pursue this branch of our subject to 
any extent. It is a region full of instruction ; and 
as far as philosophy is concerned its rich mines are 
yet undiscovered. Indeed, it has been supposed 
that they must not be admitted into the founda- 
tions of philosophy. 

We shall probably be told that poets, painters, 
and musicians are poor logicians ; and cannot be 
relied on for exact science. The converse is equally 
true that logicians are miserable poets, painters, 
and musicians. , The fault lies between them. 
Neither must be taken without the other. We 
should employ all the powers that God has given 
us ; and when the poet, the painter, and the mas- 
ter of song learn to think more; and the logician 



REASONING. 49 

learns to feel more ; the world will be much, the 
better for the blending of the two. 

UNWRITTEN PHILOSOPHY. 

Every man feels within him, what he cannot ex- 
press. The soul sickens at the pitiable attempts 
of language, to map out the exalted imager} 7 that 
spreads out to the view of the interior existence. 
In ranging over the sterile and desolate regions of 
metaphysics, ask any man if his soul is pictured 
there. If the metaphysician has entered into the 
region where he lives. He will tell you, that he would 
be ashamed of himself ; life would be irksome and 
forbidding, if he had nothing within him, more rich 
and beautiful ; more elevated and pure ; more 
sweet and enchanting ; more refined and heavenly, 
than mental science has ever hinted at. There is 
not an untaught savage, who has not more knowl- 
edge of the real elements of the soul, than philos 
ophy can ever explain. To attempt to get a knowl- 
edge of man, by any other means, than the action 
of the soul, is as hopeless, as to go to the sepulcher 
and inspect the dust, and the fragments of his 
being slumbering there. 

Physiology and anatomy may furnish a wide field 
for curious inquiry, and awaken our curiosity and 
admiration of the supreme wisdom which made us 
5 



50 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

so wonderfully and fearfully ; but the anatomy of 
the soul — the physiology of the spiritual essence 
within, is far more wonderful. 

Phrenology with its glow-worm lamp, may point 
out some of the exponents of the vast powers with- 
in ; as the structure of a house may give some hint 
as to the purpose for which it is intended. 

The size of a river may afford some probabilities, 
but it does not indicate the depth of the stream, 
the rapidity of the current, nor the quality of the 
water. It is no index to the extent and depth of 
the ocean into which it pours its waters ; nor the 
resources of the country through which it passes ; 
nor the capacities of the hidden streams that pen- 
etrate deep into the interior regions. 

The size of a river tells us nothing of the in- 
herent principles of causation. 

The study of phrenology is entitled to the same 
attention that other natural sciences are ; but the 
foolish practice of giving it a prerogative above tho 
inherent powers of the soul, reflects severely on 
the judgment and good sense of those who thus 
pervert it. 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 51 



METHODS OF PROVING THE EXIST- 
ENCE OF A GOD. 

FIRST METHOD. 

Proposition I. — Something Exists. 

This proposition is necessarily true, or all hu- 
man reasoning is false. There can be no such 
thing as reasoning, unless something exists. 
Therefore he that attempts to reason, or to even 
think, or to affirm any thing, acknowledges this 
proposition to be true. 

No man can deny it, or even doubt it, without 
admitting it to be true ; because, if it is not true 
no man exists, and nothing can be either doubted 
or denied ; and nothing exists to be either doubted 
or denied ; and therefore this proposition does not 
exist. All things exist only in imagination ; and 
yet the imagination does not exist. We are there- 
fore perpetually deceived ; and yet w T e do not exist 
to be deceived ; and therefore we are perpetually 
deceived while it is impossible for us to be deceived. 
As far as philosophizing is concerned, this proposi- 
tion must be considered true. He that does not 
allow it to be true, cannot attempt to reason ; and 
therefore he is out of the way, and there is no op- 



52 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

position to the proposition. The moment he raises 
opposition ; he admits its truth by admitting his 
own existence, and the existence of the proposition. 

The existence of something is the elementary 
proposition of all reasoning. We cannot even 
affirm nonentity, but by virtue of entity. There- 
fore he that affirms nonentity admits entity. 

The proposition is therefore sustained ; and we 
have one fixed point from which reasoning cannot 
drive us. 

The reliableness of this deduction arises from 
the following facts : 

1. It is affirmed by consciousness, which is the 
highest source of evidence. 

2. From the direct admissions of all men. 

3. From the fact that he who denies it, admits 
it as effectually as he who admits it. 

The fact that it can be denied, shows : 

1. That there is some one to deny ; and, 

2. That there is something to be denied. 

Proposition II. — Something always did exist. 

If something does exist, it necessarily follows, 
that something always did exist ; because : 

1. Something could not be made by nothing. 
That which is made, presupposes an antecedent ; 
therefore something must have existed before the 
first thing was made. 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 53 

2. A thing could not come into existence spon- 
taneously ; because no effect could be produced 
without a cause. If there ever was a time wdien 
no cause existed, no effect could have followed. 

3. A thing could not make itself; because it 
must first exist before it could act; and it must 
act before it could make itself. Therefore it must 
exist before it could exist, and must perform f the 
act of making itself before it came into existence. 
If it made itself it was the cause of its own exist- 
ence ; and if it was made by itself it was the effect 
of that cause. Therefore it stood in the relation 
of both cause and effect. It was both antecedent 
and consequent, and was both older and younger 
than itself. It was, before it was produced ; and 
was not, till after it was produced ; and therefore 
was and was not at the same time, which is prepos- 
terously absurd and entirely impossible. 

Nothing could come into existence without some- 
thing to make it come into existence ; because no 
event can take place without some producing cause. 
Therefore if there ever was a time when nothing 
existed ; that time must always have continued. 
It therefore necessarily follows, that something 
always existed. 

Proposition III. — Something always will exist. 
Nothing can be destroyed, without something to 



54 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

destroy it ; therefore if every thing in the universe 
could be destroyed except one, that one could 
never be destroyed, because there would be nothing 
to destroy it ; therefore one thing, at least, must 
exist forever. 

The question may arise : could not a thing de- 
stroy itself ? This however would be impossible for 
thai following reasons : 

1. An agent must exist till its work is fully 
done ; therefore if a thing could destroy itself, it 
must exist till it was fully destroyed ; and the mo- 
ment the object was fully ^accomplished, it must be 
wholly in existence and wholly out of existence, at 
the same time, which is impossible. 

2. A thing could not destroy itself; because 
that which destroys, is greater than that which 
is destroyed. The less can never destroy the 
greater. Therefore if a thing could destroy itself, 
it must be greater than itself. 

3. A thing could not be destroyed by itself; 
because that which is destroyed is less than that 
which destroys it. Therefore a thing could not 
destroy itself, without being less than itself, which 
is absurd. Consequently, if a thing could destroy 
itself; it must be both greater and less than itself, 
at the same time, which is impossible. 

4. A thing could not produce effects enough to 
destroy it ; because that which produces, is greater 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 55 

than that which it produces ; therefore a thing is 
greater than all the things which it produces ; and 
since the less cannot destroy the greater ; a thing 
cannot produce effects enough to destroy itself. 

It is sometimes asked if a serpent cannot kill a 
man ; disproving the axiom, that the less cannot 
destroy the greater. To this we reply : 

1. That the serpent does not destroy the man. 
The man still exists. Neither does the serpent kill 
the man. He is killed by a fluid which the serpent 
had no agency in bringing into existence. All that 
the serpent did was to bite the man ; which is the 
lowest exercise of the animal functions. A flea or 
a gnat might do the same. All that can be said 
about the fact of the man's being killed, is that 
there are certain fluids which have so strong a de- 
composing tendency, as to overcome the synthetic 
power of the fluids in the human body. But noth- 
ing is lost, nor destroyed by the process. A change 
of form is all that takes place. 

It is strictly true, that the less cannot destroy 
the greater ; neither can either of two equals de- 
stroy the other. Nothing can be destroyed but by 
something superior to itself. 

In arguing the eternal existence of God, writers 
have conceded too much in saying that God has 
no sufficient motive to destroy Himself. They 
should have said rather that He could not do it. 



56 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

He could no more destroy Himself, than He could do 
any other wrong act. He cannot do what is not in 
His nature to do. 

A fig tree cannot produce grapes, simply because 
it has no function for that purpose ; neither can God 
do a bad act. He has no attribute by which He 
can do wrong ; and to destroy Himself would be the 
most hurtful of all acts ; because it would result in 
the destruction of every thing else. 

He not only has no sufficient motive, but He has 
not the power. It would involve a solecism. It 
would be the application of an infinite power to the 
removal of an infinite resistance. An infinite power 
cannot be resisted ; and an infinite resistance can- 
not be overcome. A resistless power applied to an 
immovable obstacle, is a complete contradiction in 
terms ; because if there is an infinite power there 
is no such thing as an immovable impediment ; 
and if there is an immovable impediment there can 
be no such thing as an infinite power. But God 
being infinite in all His attributes^ He can exert all 
power and resist all power ; therefore He is above 
all powers or attributes of being destroyed. 

Again, in order to destroy Himself., He must be 
both an active agent and a passive substance ; be- 
cause that which destroys is active ; and that w T hich 
is destroyed is passive ; therefore he must be both 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 57 

active and passive, at the same time, which is 
absurd and impossible. 

Again, He must be both superior and inferior. 
That which destroys, is superior to that which is 
d&stroyed ; and that which is destroyed, is inferior 
to that which destroys. God, in order to destroy 
Himself, must stand in both of these relations, at the 
same time, which is absurd. 

It has been remarked, that there are but three 
ways in which a thing can be destroyed; viz., by 
decay, by self-destruction, and by a superior force. 
But all of these are identical. If a thing should 
decay, it must be by the action of superior elements ; 
and could a thing destroy itself, it must be greater 
than itself ; consequently there is no way in which 
a thing can be destroyed, but by a superior agency. 
Therefore the greatest thing of all can never be 
destroyed ; because there is nothing greater than 
itself to destroy it. 

It is now demonstrated beyond all power of con- 
tradiction, that — something does exist, something 
always did exist, and something always will exist ; 
or in other words, we have demonstrated the 
eternal existence of something. 

Now this Eternal Existence must have been 
a cause, and not an effect. 

An effect necessarily presupposes a cause ; and 



58 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

consequently, an effect could not have existed for- 
ever. 

Therefore an effect could not have been the first 
thing that existed ; and therefore that something 
which always existed, must have been a cause. 

We now have an eternal uncaused cause ; which 
is, and teas, and will be without beginning — with- 
out end. Something which was not caused by it- 
self, nor by any other agency ; which cannot decay 
of itself, nor by any other agency ; cannot be de- 
stroyed by itself, nor by any other agency. 

This cause must have been the cause of all 
things else. Nothing could begin without a cause, 
and every cause must have had a beginning, except 
that cause which had no beginning. Therefore 
every thing that has had a beginning, must have 
resulted from something which had no beginning. 

Nothing can strictly be said to result from a 
cause which had a beginning ; because that which 
had a beginning, had a cause. If A was caused 
by B, and B by C ; then A was caused by C. If C 
was caused by B, and B by A ; then B and C are 
both effects caused by A. 

Therefore nothing can strictly be caused but by an 
uncaused cause. A caused cause is but an effect ; 
therefore an uncaused cause is the only cause that 
can strictly be said to exist. 

Hence every thing that has had a beginning, 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 59 

must have had a cause ; and every real cause must 
have been uncaused. Therefore every thing that 
has had a beginning must have come from an un- 
caused cause. 

This uncaused cause must have possessed intel- 
ligence, or it could not have produced the intelli- 
gent results which we notice in nature. 

It must have possessed infinite intelligence or 
omniscience, to have conceived the great mechanism 
of the universe. A finite mind could not compre- 
hend, much less originate such a plan. 

It must have possessed infinite power or omnip- 
otence, to execute such a plan. 

It must have been omnipresent, to be in all parts 
of the universe at the same time, superintending 
the operations of nature. 

It must have been all-seeing, to be able to see 
on all sides of a sphere, and especially of all 
spheres, at the same time, and be able to notice the 
progress of every leaf and every plant ; the pulsa- 
tions of every insect, and the wants of every living 
thing ; not only on the earth, but on the infinite as- 
semblage of worlds throughout the vast empire of 
the universe. 

Now if we put these attributes together, we have 
the exact idea of a God. ^ 

If we have made no mistake, we have now proved 
the existence of a God who existed from eternity, 



80 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

and will continue to exist to eternity; without 
cause, without beginning, without change, without 
decay, without end. 

SECOND METHOD. 

Proposition I. — Mind is not matter. 

In determining whether mind is, or is not mat- 
ter ; we must proceed as a naturalist would, in 
classifying any other natural objects. 

We know nothing of either mind or matter s but 
by its properties and effects. Matter has certain 
essential properties, all of which must be present 
at the same time, or matter cannot exist. If mind 
is matter, all these properties must be common to 
both mind and matter, at the same time, or mind 
cannot exist. The essential properties of matter 
are, impenetrability , extension, figure, divisibil- 
ity, inertia and attraction. 

Now if our proposition is not true, let the oppo- 
site be true, that mind is matter, and let us iden- 
tify it as such, by the presence of these essential 
properties of matter. Let us compare it with mat- 
ter on the score of impenetrability. By impenetra- 
bility we mean, that two bodies cannot occupy the 
same space, at the same time. How is it with 
mind ? Can two minds occupy the same space, at 
the same time % From the known properties and 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 61 

effects of mind, we have no evidence that it re- 
gards space, as such, at all. We have no evidence 
that space is a term which can, in any respect, be 
applied to mind ; and if it can be restricted to any 
given space, that shall mark its limit of extension ; 
we have no evidence that it could exclude all other 
minds from the space which it occupies. It is as 
reasonable to suppose that a thousand minds can 
occupy the same space, as that one mind can be 
restricted to any given space ; hence our experiment 
has wholly failed to show the presence of impene- 
trability in mind ; and we have not obtained a par- 
ticle of evidence that mind is matter. 

Let us compare mind and matter with reference 
to extension. Matter, under all circumstances, 
must have length, breadth, and thickness. Is this 
also a property of mind ? Has mind length, 
breadth, and thickness? If so, who will tell what 
is the length, breadth, and thickness of any mind ? 
Are all minds equally long or broad, or do some 
minds exceed others by a certain number of feet, 
inches, or barley-corns? Is the mind longer or 
shorter than the body, or does it fill some certain 
cavity in some part of the body ? If the known 
properties and effects of mind enable us to deter- 
mine any thing in relation to it, it serves to prove 
to us the entire absurdity of these questions, when 
applied to mind. That no such property can 
6 



62 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

belong to mind, is an axiom which coincides with 
all our knowledge respecting it; therefore our 
second experiment has also failed to afford any evi- 
dence that mind is matter. 

Let us compare mind and matter with reference 
to figure or form. Matter, under all circumstan- 
ces, must have some kind of form. We say of 
bodies, that they are globular, cylindrical, or cubi- 
cal, etc. Some are in the form of a pyramid or 
cone, others irregular. How is it with mind ? Is 
it in the form of a globe, or a pyramid, a cylinder, 
a cone, a prism, or a cube ? If human wisdom or 
experience can furnish any answer to these ques- 
tions, it is, that they are ridiculous when applied 
to mind ; and our third experiment has also failed 
to discover any analogy between mind and matter. 

Compare mind and matter with reference to 
divisibility. All forms of matter may be separated 
into parts ; and those parts into other parts, and 
so on, indefinitely. It is doubtful if it is in the 
power of man to separate matter into particles so 
minute, as to be susceptible of no further division ; 
and yet every particle will be perfect matter still. 
Now can you divide mind in this way ? Can it be 
pulverized, until its particles are infinitely minute ; 
and yet have every particle perfect mind still? 
Matter may be resolved into its original or simple 
elements ; but can mind be so resolved ? We have 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 63 

no evidence that mind is composed of parts, or that 
it is capable of existing in any other form than that 
of unity. We do not know that mind can be re- 
solved into its original elements ; because we do 
not know that it is compounded of elements, or that 
it can exist in any simpler form; therefore this ex- 
periment has also failed to show any resemblance 
between mind and matter. 

Compare mind and matter with reference to 
inertia. By inertia we mean that matter has no 
control over its own actions. When put in motion 
it has no power to bring itself to rest ; or when at 
rest it has no power to put itself in motion. If a 
rock be placed in a certain position, it will remain 
in that position, until removed by some other 
agency. If a body near the surface of the earth be 
put in motion, it will soon be brought to rest, by 
virtue of several forces which it has no power to 
resist, or modify. Could a body be put in motion 
in the absence of all external force, it is acknowl- 
edged by all philosophers, that it would never come 
to rest ; but would move with uniform motion for- 
ever. The matter of which the human body is 
composed, has no power to move of itself. The 
arm cannot rise, unless the mind direct it to rise ; 
the foot cannot move, unless the mind command it 
to move ; the body cannot rise up or lie down at 
pleasure, without the agency of the mind. How is 



64 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

it with mind in these respects ? Has it any con- 
trol over its own , actions 1 Can it direct its own 
movements ? Yes, it forms the business of human 
life, for mind to direct its own movements. It can 
summon its energies, and direct them to a given 
object for a given time ; it can then arrest them 
and direct them to any other object. In this re- 
spect, it possesses properties which do not belong 
to matter ; and therefore it is not matter. 

But mind can control not only its own motions, 
but it can control matter also. It can pass matter 
through an infinite variety of compositions, and de- 
compositions, and recompositions. 

And since mind controls matter, it follows that 
it is greater than matter ; because that which con- 
trols is greater than that which is controlled. 
Therefore mind is not matter. 

Proposition II. — Mind did not arise from the 
organization of matter. 

If mind is not matter, it follows of course that 
mind did not arise from the organization of matter. 
This is quite obvious. Since mind is not matter, 
it is impossible to put matter together in such a 
manner as to make something which is not matter. 
Matter will be matter still 3 however changed or 
modified. 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 65 

Simples cannot be put together, so as to make 
any thing not contained in the simples. 

It is allowed by philosophers, that in all the pro- 
cesses of nature since the creation of the world, 
nothing has added, and nothing lost. 

The following anecdotes will illustrate the ab- 
surdity of supposing, that the proposition is not 
true, that mind did not arise from the organization 
of matter. 

During a public lecture, which the author gave 
on this subject ; a young man arose in the audience, 
and asked if the galvanic battery was not an excep- 
tion to the proposition. The young man was asked 
if he could make any new thing, by means of the 
galvanic battery? He thought he could. The 
speaker then turned to the audience, and remarked, 
" You have a very remarkable young man in your 
midst. He can take his galvanic battery, and 
actually exert creative power. He can make what 
did not exist before. Now if he can make one thing, 
he can make ten ; and if he can make ten, he can 
make a hundred ; and if a hundred, he can a thou- 
sand, etc. You may therefore see your neighbor- 
hood teeming with new and unheard-of forms. " 

During a public debate on the subject, an antag- 
onist brought in a flint and steel, and produced 
sparks in copious abundance ; but he was reminded 
that he did not perform the act of creation. He 



66 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

produced no new thing ; but merely developed what 
already existed. 

These illustrations will sufficiently show, that 
mind did not arise from the organization of matter. 
There is a philosophical impossibility in the case. 
Materialism must give up this point till it can dis- 
prove these propositions. 

Proposition III. — Mind, or the intelligent 
principle, existed before the organization of 
matter. 

Every process of nature evinces the presence of 
an intelligent and designing cause ; nature never 
takes an unintelligent step ; that nature is guided 
by intelligence in all her works, no intelligent phi- 
losopher will venture to deny ; and yet should the 
fact be denied there are few propositions so clearly 
susceptible of proof. The difficulties experienced 
in proving the proposition do not arise from the 
want of evidence, but from the great amount of 
evidence from which we are obliged to choose. 
Fully to argue the proposition, would require far 
more time than can be devoted to this whole argu- 
ment. Therefore we shall consider it briefly. 
Should we travel into a far country, uninhabited by 
man ; and should we find a human footstep petri- 
fied in a rock ; we would necessarily infer : 

1. That a human being had been there. 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 67 

2. That that human being existed before the im- 
pression was made ; because the footprint could 
not have been made until there was a foot to make 
it. Now when we inspect the organization of mat- 
ter, we every where discover the footsteps of intel- 
ligence, and we necessarily infer : 

1. That intelligence had been there, and, 
U. That intelligence existed before the impres- 
sions were made. Because intelligence could not 
make impressions, until it first existed ; conse- 
quently if intelligence was employed in the organi- 
zation of matter ; that intelligence existed before 
that organization. If this conclusion be not true, 
let the opposite be true ; that intelligence was em- 
ployed in the organization of matter, but did not 
exist before that organization. Then it follows, 
that intelligence was employed before it existed ; 
or that it existed before it did exist ; that it acted 
before it did act ; and that it was an active, de- 
signing cause, controlling all the infinite processes of 
nature, comprehending the whole mechanism of the 
material universe, before it was itself brought into 
existence. Now let it be still further true, as the 
naturalist alleges, that mind arose from the organ- 
ization of matter ; now since intelligence was em- 
ployed in the organization of matter, and arose from 
that organization ; it follows that intelligence was 
employed in making itself. Let us suppose a par- 



68 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

allel case ; that when our Pilgrim fathers landed 
upon Plymouth rock, they had the misfortune to 
lose their ship. Now they could not return to 
Europe without a ship, and they could not build a 
ship until they could go to Europe for materials. 
They were now in a dilemma. Materialism would 
furnish an easy solution of this difficulty. They 
might first take the ship, and go to Europe ; and 
get the materials; and then return and build 
the ship ; or they might employ tho ship to build 
itself. It will be seen that there is nothing absurd 
in this, when we consider, that the time was when 
intelligence was needed to organize matter, but in- 
telligence could not be obtained, until matter was 
first organized — now here was a dilemma. Matter 
could not be organized until intelligence existed ; 
and intelligence could not exist until matter was 
organized. How was this difficulty surmounted? 
Simply by employing intelligence to organize mat- 
ter, so that, during the process it might make itself. 
From this process of reasoning, it is obvious that 
if intelligence was employed in the organization of 
matter, it necessarily existed before that organiza- 
tion ; hence our proposition is proved; that in- 
telligence existed before the organization of matter. 

Proposition IV.— Mind, or the intelligent 
principle, existed before matter itself. 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 69 

It has been shown, that mind existed before the 
organization of matter ; and if it did not exist be- 
fore matter itself, it must have come into existence 
during an interval between the existence, and the 
organization of matter. But according to the show- 
ing of materialism, matter was organized by virtue 
of principles inherent in itself ; and it follows, that 
the process of organization must have commenced 
as soon as matter existed. We cannot conceive, 
that there ever was a time, when matter did not 
possess the same properties that it does at present ; 
because if we deprive it of any of its essential prop- 
erties, it would cease to be matter. Therefore on 
this hypothesis, there could not have been an in- 
terval between the existence and the organization of 
matter. Therefore if mind existed before the or- 
ganization, it existed before the existence of matter. 

As far as materialism is concerned, our proposi- 
tion is now proved : " That mind existed before 
matter. 55 Now it remains to be considered, whether 
on any other hypothesis, this conclusion could be 
unsettled. 

If mind did not exist before matter, let the op- 
posite be true, that matter existed .before mind. It 
then follows that matter is that something which 
always existed. (First Method, Prop. III.) That 
it was the cause of all other things, and that mind 
was produced by matter. 



70 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

And since the cause is greater than all the effects 
■which it produces, matter is, on this supposition, 
greater than all other things put together. There- 
fore on this hypothesis, we have matter greater than 
mind. But it is evident, that mind controls mat- 
ter ; and that which controls is greater than that 
which is controlled ; therefore mind must be greater 
than matter ; and we have mind both greater and 
less than matter, which is absurd ; and that rea- 
soning which leads to absurdity is false. Hence 
matter could not have existed before mind. 

On another hypothesis, let us assume, that both 
mind and matter always existed. Now we have 
two things which existed without a cause. But 
subsequently mind organized matter ; and therefore 
controlled matter ; and therefore it was greater 
than matter. Now we have a subordinate existence, 
which is controlled by a superior existence, and yet 
which existed independently of that superior exist- 
ence, and therefore we have a subordinate which is 
controlled, and not controlled, at the same time, 
which is absurd ; for it would be but partially con- 
trolled if its existence were not controlled. 

The greater can always control the less. But 
that antecedent cause, which controls all things 
else, must necessarily control the very existence of 
all things else ; otherwise it would not have 
supreme control. Therefore the great controlling 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 71 

principle of all things, must have power to destroy 
all things except itself. Now suppose matter and 
mind always existed ; then it will still follow, from 
what we have just seen, that there never was an 
instance in which mind had not the power to con- 
trol the existence of matter, and therefore there 
never w T as a time in which mind had not the power 
to prevent the existence of matter, or to destroy it ; 
hence if matter always existed, it must have been 
with the consent of mind, which amounts so nearly 
to the act of creating matter that there is nothing 
left worth contending for. But there are still 
other reasons, which lead us to the conclusion, that 
mind existed before matter. 

That amazing intelligence, which organized the 
physical universe, with all its grandeur and sub- 
limity, must have comprehended the whole chain 
of cause and effect, before the first process was put 
in operation ; but it could not have executed its 
plans, without materials adapted to its use ; no 
more than a watchmaker could make a gold w T atch, 
if he had nothing more than silver from which to 
make it. If the designing cause of all this beau- 
tiful organization, had no control over the adapted- 
ness of the materials ; they might or might not 
have been suited to the purposes intended. The 
wonderful evidences of design, which w r e every 
where recognize in the works of nature, arise as 



72 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

much from the properties of matter, as from its 
organization ; and even more, because the or- 
ganization takes place by the intelligent adapt- 
edness of the constituent properties of matter 
to the uses intended. The most obvious evi- 
dences of intelligence are found in those prop- 
erties or tendencies of matter, by which their 
mutual affinities produce spontaneous organiza- 
tion. 

Now if mind or. intelligence was employed in 
the organization of matter, much more was it 
employed in the production of matter, and the 
determining of its peculiar properties with ref- 
erence to future plans. It is therefore evident 
that mind, or the intelligent principle, existed 
before matter existed — was the agent by which it 
was organized, and also by which it was pro- 
duced or created. Every evidence, both proba- 
ble and possible, denies the supposition that mat- 
ter existed antecedent to intelligence, or inde- 
pendent of it. 

We have now traced intelligence back of matter, 
and as mind and matter compose the universe, 
mind must be the antecedent cause of all things. 
And as the first cause could not have been 
caused, mind was not caused, and could have 
had no beginning. We now have mind as 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD, 73 

a cause which was not caused, the original, antece- 
dent, efficient cause of all other things, a cause 
which had no beginning, and which can have no end. 

We may now dismiss matter from the inquiry ; 
and go on with intelligence alone. We can judge of 
the character of this intelligence from the nature 
of its works. From all that we know, and all that 
we can infer, the universe on which we live is infi- 
nite in extent. If it can have any possible limit, 
it must lie far beyond the reach of human investi- 
gation, or human imagination ; if indeed it has any 
prescribed limit, it rests upon so vague a supposi- 
tion, that no intelligent philosopher will ever make 
it the basis of an argument ; indeed, its infinite ex- 
tension is admitted by every intelligent philosopher. 
And if it is infinite in extent, that mind which com- 
prehended it, is omnicient ; and that power which 
organized it, is omnipotent ; and that presence 
which watches over and guides all its movements, 
is omnipresent. Now putting all these attributes 
together, we have an Omnicient, an Omnipotent, 
and aji Omnipresent Intelligence, which was, and 
is, and will be without beginning, and without end ; 
which answers precisely to the idea that is excited 
in our minds, when we speak of a God who created 
and sustains all things. 

The objector sometimes asks, How God could 
create something from nothing 1 
1 



74 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

To this question we may reply, 

1. The question overlooks the real issue. The 
question is not, how or when or where He did it, 
but, did He do it 1 

2. That something was produced where nothing 
existed before has been shown. Unless every thing 
existed from eternity ; something must have had a 
beginning, and must have been created ; and if 
created, it must have been by making something 
exist, when nothing existed before. The act of 
creation implies the act of bringing something into 
existence. But if a thing were made from some- 
thing that already existed, no act of creation 
would be performed. 

3. Those who reject the idea of creation, and ac- 
count for the existence of things without the act of 
creation ; are unavoidably thrown upon the very 
difficulties that they would avoid. 

In rejecting the idea of creation, they are com- 
pelled to adopt the theory of infinite progression, 
w r hich proceeds on the basis of making the greater 
come from the less. A monkey becomes a man, etc. 

If a thing can be increased without adding any 
thing to it ; the act amounts to that of creation. 
If a quantity equal to four can be made equal to 
eight, without adding any thing to it ; then a quan- 
tity equal to four has been created from nothing. 
Materialism denies the act of creation, and yet holds 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 75 

that mind arose from the organization of matter. 
Now mind controls matter, and is therefore greater 
than matter ; and if it came from matter, the 
greater came from the less ; which involves all the 
absurdity which the objector professes to see in the 
act of creation. 

4. The question is also answered by saying, that 
we have proved the existence of an infinite power, 
which existed before matter existed ; and was the 
original uncaused cause of all things ; and an infi- 
nite power is sufficient to account for any thing else 
that may follow. 

Should an objection still be raised, on the ground 
that the universe may not be infinite ; and there- 
fore that which made it may not be infinite ; we 
reply, that an intelligence which knows all things 
past, present, and future, must be an all-knowing 
or omnicient intelligence. That which can see all 
things past, present, and future, must be an all- 
seeing intelligence. That which can control the 
whole chain of cause and effect, and can act in the 
future as well as the present, so as to determine all 
possible events, and work independently of time, 
distance, or casualty, must be omnipotent. That 
which can be present, at the same time, in all the 
opposite parts of the universe, so as to superintend 
all nature's works — attend to the wants of every 
little plant ; hear the cry of every little insect ; reg- 



76 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

ulate the motions of all systems and spheres — in fine, 
that which is everywhere, at the same time, must be 
omnipresent ; and these attributes combined make 
up the idea of a God. 

THIRD METHOD. 

All organized forms are composed of elements. 
Compounds cannot exist, till the elements first 
exist ; therefore, matter must once have existed 
in an elementary or uncombined state. 

As matter was susceptible of being changed into 
an infinite variety of forms, it could not take any- 
one of those forms in preference to another, without 
something to determine its choice ; and matter must 
have remained eternally at rest, in the absence of 
any thing to direct or control it ; therefore, some- 
thing controlled the action of matter, to cause it to 
take particular forms. 

Now since that which controls is greater than 
that which is controlled ; it follows that that which 
controlled the action of matter, was greater than 
matter. 

But the greater cannot come from the less ; there- 
fore, that which was greater than matter did not 
come from matter. 

It could not have been matter ; because that 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 77 

would make matter greater than itself, which is im- 
possible. 

It could not have been a property of matter ; 
because that would make a property of a thing 
greater than the thing itself, or a part greater than 
the whole, which is impossible. 

It could not have been caused by matter, because 
the effect cannot be greater than the cause. 

It must have possessed intelligence ; or it could 
not have produced an intelligent result. This in- 
telligence could not have arisen from the organiza- 
tion of matter ; because the organization was pro- 
duced by this intelligence. 

It must have possessed infinite intelligence ; for it 
knew the future as well as the present and the past. 
It must have seen the whole chain of cause and 
effect involved in the plan of the universe ; and 
this could be the case only with an unlimited in- 
telligence ; therefore it must have been omnis- 
cient. 

It must have had power to control all the opera- 
tions of nature ; therefore it must have been om- 
nipotent. 

It must have been present, at the same time, in 
all parts of the universe ; or it could not have con- 
trolled all the remote and infinitely distant parts, 
at the same time, and especially it could not have 
been on all sides of a globe, and certainly not of all 



78 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

globes at the same time ; therefore, it must have 
been omnipresent. 

It must have been an all-seeing intelligence ; or 
it could not have seen in all parts of the universe, 
at the same time. 

These attributes make up the idea of a God ; 
therefore, a God existed antecedent to, and inde- 
pendent of, the organization of the universe. 

But being omnipotent, He must have controlled 
the properties of the particles or elements of mat- 
ter. This could be done only by the exercise of 
this power before the properties of matter were es- 
tablished or created. The determining power 
must therefore have existed before the particles 
of matter existed ; and therefore must have been 
eternal or uncaused. 

Now we have an uncaused, infinite, omniscient, 
omnipotent, omnipresent, all-seeing intelligence, 
which is the exact idea of a God, " Whose center 
is everywhere, and whose circumference is no 
where." 

FOURTH METHOD. 

From Cause and Effect. 

Men are naturally prompted to act for the ac- 
complishment of some end. They are conscious 
that they can produce effects ; and they cannot be 



DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 79 

made to act on the assumption that no consequences 
are involved in the nature of their actions. 

Effort is the motto of the busy world. New en- 
terprises, new hopes, and higher degrees of develop- 
ment perpetually stimulate to new efforts. 

But all these result from the antecedent axiom, 
that there is such a relation among things as cause 
and effect. 

No man can deny the truthfulness of this axiom, 
but by virtue of its own authority. Should a man 
deny that there is any such thing as cause and ef- 
fect, the object of doing so would be to produce an 
effect. Therefore the denial of cause and effect is 
the admission of it. 

Should any man reason to the conclusion, that 
there is no such thing as cause and effect, he would 
still believe and act upon the consciousness of 
the fallacy of his own reasoning. He would not 
then be willing to drink deadly poison, expose 
himself to the loaded cannon, or in any way neg- 
lect the observance of the great laws of personal 
safety. 

Could any one really disbelieve that there is any 
such thing as cause and effect, he would never try 
to do any thing. He would never attempt to shun 
danger, or to seek safety, and would not attempt to 
accomplish his designs. 

But all men do exert themselves to accomplish 



80 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

certain objects ; therefoie all men act on the rela- 
tion of cause and effect ; and admit the existence 
of such a relation of things. 

Should any one admit the relation of cause and 
effect, the admission would be an attempt to pro- 
duce an effect. 

Should any one attempt to prove the existence 
of such a thing as cause, and effect, his object in 
doing so would be to produce an effect ; therefore 
the very attempt to prove would antecedently as- 
sume the relation. It must, therefore, be admitted 
in the premises of the argument, and could not be 
brought into the conclusion. 

Should any one attempt to disprove it, the at- 
tempt to disprove would be an attempt to produce 
an effect ; therefore the act of attempting to dis- 
prove it, admits it. 

Should any one deny it, the act of denying would 
be an attempt to produce an effect ; and would be 
an admission of the fact. 

Every attempt to reason on any subject is an at- 
tempt to prove or discover something ; but an at- 
tempt to prove or discover something is an attempt 
to adapt means to ends; or to employ causes to 
produce effects. Hence cause and effect is a neces- 
sary element in all reasoning. 

Reasoning derives all its authority from cause and 
effect i which is firmly seated in our consciousness. 



DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 81 

It is an element in, is antecedent to, and inde- 
pendent of, reasoning. 



Physical, Intellectual, and Moral Cause and 

Effect. 

Men pursue agriculture, manufactures, and com- 
merce, in full assurance of physical cause and ef- 
fect. 

Discreet parents teach their children to read and 
Write — acquaint them with history to store their 
minds with facts ; teach them mathematics to 
strengthen their reasoning powers, and philoso- 
phy to teach them the reason of things. But all 
this is done by virtue of intellectual cause and 
effect. 

All good persons teach their children in the rules 
of uprightness and truth, in full assurance that 
there is such a thing as moral cause and effect. 

We now perceive that, 

1. All men are naturally prompted to act on the 
relation of cause and effect, and can not act on any 
other. 

2. No man can deny the relation of cause and 
effect, without first admitting it. 

3. Should any one reason to the conclusion that 
there is no such thing as cause and effect, he would 
still believe and assume it. 



82 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

4. No man can disbelieve, that there is such a 
thing as cause and effect ; because he cannot dis- 
believe contrary to his consciousness, which per- 
petually prompts him to act on the assumption of 
cause and effect. 

5. No one can prove the existence of any such 
thing as cause and effect, without first admitting 
the point in dispute ; and making that admission the 
foundation of the proof. 

6. No person can admit the fact ; because the 
admission would be intended to produce an effect ; 
and it would presuppose the existence of such a re- 
lation of things as cause and effect ; therefore the 
fact cannot even be admitted without a double ad- 
mission. 

7. Every attempt to reason on any subject, is an 
admission that there is such a thing as cause and 
effect. 

8. It is an element in all reasoning ; is antece- 
dent to all reasoning ; gives effect to reasoning ; is 
therefore independent of reasoning ; and can be 
neither admitted nor denied, proved nor disproved, 
by any logical process. 

Therefore there is such a relation among things 
as cause and effect. 

But there being such a thing as cause and effect; 
there must be an uncaused cause. 

Every effect presupposes a cause. 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 83 

A cause wliich was caused is but an effect ; and 
must have had a cause ; therefore every effect pre- 
supposes an uncaused cause, 

A caused cause, or a secondary cause, was 
caused by something which existed before this 
caused cause. Therefore a caused cause is not the 
real cause ; and we find no cause at all, till we find 
a cause which was not caused. 

Those who admit the relation of cause and effect, 
and yet deny an uncaused cause ; would make up 
the universe out of effects alone without cause, and 
would have uncaused effects ; which is absurd and 
ridiculous. 

If A is caused by B, and B by C, then A and B 
are effects, and C is the cause of both A and B. 
Now if C was not caused, it is an uncaused cause ; 
but if it was caused, then it is an effect also, and 
we have not yet found any cause at all ; and we 
can never find a cause until we find an uncaused 
cause. 

We must admit an uncaused cause ; or deny the 
relation of cause and effect. 

But to deny the relation of cause and effect, is to 
produce an effect ; which is the thing we wish to 
deny ; therefore we cannot deny cause and effect 
without admitting it. 

What object can a man have in denying cause 
and effect, if it be not to produce an effect. If he 



* 



84 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

hopes to effect nothing by it, he will not make the 
attempt. Therefore he who denies cause and effect, 
admits it ; and he who admits cause and effect, 
admits an uncaused cause. Consequently the very 
denial of cause and effect, admits an uncaused cause. 

An uncaused cause therefore is an antecedent 
idea, which cannot be denied without admitting it. 

Indeed every act of our lives is an admission of 
an uncaused cause. 

The argument may be resolved into the fol- 
lowing : 

1. Every act of our lives is designed to pro- 
duce an effect ; and is therefore an acknowledg- 
ment of the existence of cause and effect. 

2. Every effect must have a cause. 

3. A cause which had a cause, is only an effect. 

4. Therefore an effect implies an uncaused cause. 

5. And since every act acknowledges cause and 
effect ; every act acknowledges an uncaused cause. 

6. The denial of cause and effect, is an act; 
which is intended to produce an effect ; and there- 
fore acknowledges cause and effect. Hence, 

7. The denial of cause and effect, is an acknowl- 
edgment of an uncaused cause. 

This uncaused cause must have been the cause 
of all things else ; and must have been greater than 
all things else. It must have possessed intelligence, 
in order to produce intelligent results. 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 85 

It must have possessed omniscience, to conceive 
the plan of the universe. 

It must have possessed omnipotence, to execute 
such a plan. 

It must have been all-seeing, to see in every part 
of the universe at the same time. 

Indeed it must have been exactly what we mean 
wiien we speak of a God. 

It could not have been matter, because matter 
includes the relation of cause and effect. And this 
uncaused cause could not have been thus composed. 
It could not have been either wholly or in part 
composed of effects. Matter also seems to be the 
passive object on which causation is exerted ; there- 
fore it cannot be the active agent which exerts that 
causation. 

It cannot be both active and passive, w T ith regard 
to the same action. 

This antecedent cause must have caused matter, 
or matter could not have been so admirably adapted 
to the purposes of a great intelligent cause. 

Therefore this uncaused cause was an all-power- 
ful, all-wise, omnipresent intelligence ; or an all- 
wise and omnipotent God ; who is, and was, and 
will be, without beginning, without cause, without 
change, without decay, without end. 
8 



86 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

IFTH METHOD. 

From the Freedom of the Will. 

Every man acknowledges that he has some agency 
in the guidance of his acts. When approaching a 
precipice, he does not say that he is under the guid- 
ance of the unerring laws of the universe, and there- 
fore has no power to turn aside. If struck by an 
assassin, he does not tamely say it is the work of 
regular laws, over which he nor the assassin has any 
power. 

No one has sufficient confidence in the fixidness of 
natural laws, to dismiss all fear and apprehension ; 
and trust the interests of himself and family to the 
mercy of the elements, and the harmonious workings 
of natural phenomena. Whatever may be a man's 
theory, he will make some effort to avoid drinking 
poison, falling down a precipice, or running into 
any extreme danger. 

We find also that this does not indicate a diseased 
state of the intellect ; but, on the contrary, it is the 
regular and uniform result of the unperverted 
mind. 

We notice also that when the formula of logical 
inductions have brought out the conclusion that all 
things are governed by fixed and undeviating laws ; 
and man has no agency in any thing that transpires, 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 87 

the mind still recognizes its ability to seek its own 
good, and supervise the exigencies of life. 

Logic cannot allay its fears, nor satisfy its de- 
sires. It still feels the strivings of a principle too 
active in its energies, too enterprising in its aims, 
to haughty in its aspirations, to be thus reduced to 
the level of a stone, or a clod of the valley. 

Nor is this a partial result. All men — all phil- 
osophers — even thd most confirmed skeptics follow 
the same law. 

They may amuse themselves with the eccentric 
achievements of mental gymnastics ; by which it 
may be shown that two opposites may be true ; or 
that a man cannot move from one place to another ; 
but when danger assails, or w T ant inspires, the 
powers of philosophy give place to the teachings of 
consciousness. No man trusts his own philosophy 
when that philosophy contradicts the simple affirm- 
ations of his intuition. The fatalist has never yet 
evinced the least faith in his own theory, by adopt- 
ing it in the practical affairs of business. He has 
never yet been known to risk a single farthing upon 
the verity of his philosophy. His speculations lead 
where his courage refuses to follow. 

From what we have seen it is apparent, 

1. That all men believe that the human will is 
free in its volitions. 

2. That it is so obvious, that all minds are nat- 



88 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

urally led to this conclusion ; and cannot be made 
to trust the opposite. 

3. That even when the mind is led to the oppo- 
site conclusion., it rebels against it, and will not re- 
ceive it. 

4. That this is not a result produced on diseased 
minds alone. It is the conclusion to which all 
minds arrive in the most healthy and unperverted 
state. 

But it is a well settled principle in natural sci- 
ence, that the regular and unperverted impulses of 
nature, lead to the correct use of every function. 
Nature prompts all men to walk on their feet, and 
not on their hands ; to see with their eyes, to hear 
with their ears, and to work with their hands. 
Nor are these partial results. They are the uni- 
form promptings of all minds alike. 

Should any one be led to the conclusion that they 
are false, he would not adopt the results of his own 
reasoning. He would still walk on his feet, and 
hear with his ears, and see with his eyes ; and be 
convinced that these organs were legitimately em- 
ployed. 

But these dictates of nature are no more uniform 
and convincing, than the conviction that the will is 
free from arbitrary control — that man ip free in the 
choice of his actions — that he is responsible for the 
results ; and that duty and interest alike demand 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 89 

of liim a prudent exercise of the liberty which he 
possesses. 

Man has as clear evidence that he wills, as that 
he sees or hears. 

The freedom of the will is a fact which stands 
above the reach of sophistry. It is so firmly forti- 
fied against all opposition, that any logical formula 
which can be made to deny it, will at the same 
time admit it. 

A man cannot deny the freedom of the will, till 
he wills to deny it ; and he cannot will to deny it, 
till he has power to control his will. 

Therefore the moment any one admits that he 
performs an act of any kind, he admits that he 
wills, and therefore that he has power to will. 
Hence, he cannot construct a sentence of any kind 
without admitting the freedom of the will. There- 
fore the same proposition which denies the freedom 
of the will admits it. 

The freedom of the will is a necessary element 
in the subject of a proposition, and can neither be 
admitted nor denied in the predicate. It belongs to 
the premises of an argument, and is a necessary 
element which cannot be separated from the prem- 
ises ; and cannot be brought into the conclusion. 

It cannot be proved because it becomes a part 
of the proof, and therefore it cannot be established 
by the proof. We cannot prove a thing till we 



90 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

will to do so ; and we cannot will to do so unless 
we have power to use the will. Therefore the 
attempt to prove is an acknowledgement of the 
freedom of the will. 

We cannot even admit the freedom of the will, 
because we cannot admit it till we will to admit it, 
and we cannot will to admit it till we have the 
ability to use the will. Therefore the act of ad- 
mitting the freedom of the will presupposes it, and 
the thing is admitted both in the subject and in the 
predicate ; and it amounts to an admission before 
it can be admitted. 

The freedom of the will is affirmed by our intui- 
tions ; and that is the highest source of authority. 
What our consciousness declares our logic can- 
not dispute. Therefore the freedom of the will 
stands above the province of logic, and can be 
neither proved nor disproved, admitted nor denied, 
received nor rejected. It must be let alone, as 
one of those things which are known without rea- 
soning, and from which reasoning is derived. 

It is common with logicians to admit the free- 
dom of the will, and then by an ingenious process 
to effectually deny it. 

This feat is performed by the following affirma- 
tion : " Man has the freedom to choose what he 
does choose, but he has not the freedom to choose 
the opposite." 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 91 

According to this philosophy, Brutus had the 
liberty to choose to stab Caesar ; but he had not 
the liberty to choose the opposite ; therefore he 
had not the ability to choose not to stab Caesar, 
and consequently he could not have avoided the act 
of stabbing Caesar ; or in other words, Brutus was 
compelled to stab Caesar ; and this admitted free- 
dom of the will amounts to the most absolute fate, 
or irresistible and absolute control. 

This gives to man precisely the same kind of 
liberty that it does to a stone. A stone possesses 
the liberty to fall to the ground ; but it has not the 
liberty to do the opposite, and therefore it has not 
the freedom to rise ; consequently, it is compelled 
to fall. 

To say that the will is free, and that man has 
the liberty to choose to do a thing, and has no power 
to choose the opposite, involves a direct solecism. 

It is a form of words without meaning ; unless 
it means that man has the liberty to be controlled ; 
or has the liberty to do what he cannot avoid doing, 
just as the oyster has the liberty to lie still, and 
has not the liberty to fly. 

To say that an apple has the liberty to be pro- 
duced on an apple-tree, or that the blackbird has 
the liberty to be black, may be a convenient way 
of amusing one's self; but to call it reasoning is a 
liberty which we deny. 



92 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

Even that however may be justifiable, as a boy 
may make himself a clown or a king for want of 
some better employment. 

As an attempt at perverting the province of rea- 
soning, it holds a respectable rank among feats of 
sophistry ; but among candid men, reasoning on an 
important subject, such perversions of the import 
of language are quite reprehensible. 

If man has no other freedom than that of doing 
as he is compelled ; or if he has no liberty but the 
liberty of necessity ; he has nothing that comes 
within the meaning of liberty ; and to call it liberty, 
or freedom of choice, is a direct absurdity and con- 
tradiction. 

Man either has or has not a certain amount of 
freedom. He either is a machine, or is not. Let 
the issue be fairly met. We cannot allow to any 
one the liberty of arguing on one side, while he 
seems to be on the other. This pretended liberty 
of choice, is necessity, fatalism, and must not be 
allowed the garb of freedom. It is a perversion 
and prostitution of the word freedom, that cannot 
be shielded from censure. 

We have now seen, 

1. That all men believe in the freedom of the 
will. 

2. That they believe it even when they think 
their reasoning has disproved ; therefore, 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 93 

3. They believe it more firmly than they do any 
thing that depends on reasoning. 

4. That it is not the result of disease ; but of 
the healthy and regular operations of mind. 

5. That a man cannot deny it without admitting 
it, in the same proposition. 

6. That it cannot be proved nor disproved ; ad- 
mitted nor denied ; received nor rejected ; without 
assuming the point in dispute. 

7. That it is a part of the premises of every 
argument, and cannot be brought into the con- 
clusion. 

8. That it is affirmed by our consciousness ; and 
therefore is more obvious than any thing that can 
be proved by reasoning. 

9. Therefore it is a first truth which is known 
without reasoning ; is antecedent to reasoning ; is 
an element in all reasoning ; and therefore cannot 
be affirmed nor denied by reasoning; and is of 
higher authority than any thing that depends on 
reasoning. 

We have now seen that the freedom of the will 
is placed beyond the power of logic. 

But freedom of any kind implies the existence of 
a God. 

If there is no God, the governing principle must 
reside in the fixed laws of nature ; and freedom 
cannot exist. Natural laws are devoid of freedom. 



94 DEMONSTRATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 

If there is any such thing as freedom in the uni- 
verse, it must reside in something above the fixed 
order of nature. 

Either freedom or necessity must lie at the 
foundation of things. But freedom must be at the 
foundation or it cannot exist. It cannot arise out 
of necessity, because it is not contained in neces- 
sity. Unless necessity includes the elements of 
liberty, it cannot become the source of liberty. 
Therefore if liberty exists at all, it is the founda- 
tion of all things. 

But liberty does exist as a first truth, which 
logic cannot dispute. It is above the province of 
logical proof ; and must be admitted in all processes 
of reasoning. 

Liberty is therefore the governing principle of 
the universe. 

But liberty or freedom cannot exist in the ab- 
sence of a God who is free ; therefore a God exists. 

We may further observe, that liberty is an at- 
tribute. Freedom implies something that is free. 
Freedom also implies choice. Nothing can be said 
to be free, unless it has the power of choosing 
between two objects, or modes of action. Choice 
implies intelligence. No choice can be made with- 
out the exercise of thought in comparing the ob- 
jects to be chosen. 

Now since intelligence is involved in choice, and 



EXISTENCE OF A GOD. 95 

choice in freedom, and freedom is an attribute of 
some being possessing freedom ; it follows that 
choice and intelligence are attributes of the same 
being. 

We have seen that liberty is the principle which 
governs the foundations of things ; and as liberty 
is an attribute of some being, that being must be 
the governor of all things. Therefore liberty im- 
plies a great thinking, choosing, acting being ; who 
governs all things ; or liberty implies a God as the 
governor of all things. 

We have now seen that the idea of liberty im- 
plies the existence of a God ; and therefore to deny 
the existence of a God, is to deny liberty or^free- 
dom. But it has been shown that we cannot deny 
freedom without, at the same time, admitting it. 

Now we cannot deny the existence of a God, 
without denying freedom ; and we cannot deny 
freedom without admitting it ; therefore we cannot 
deny the existence of a God, without admitting it. 

The existence of a God is therefore involved in 
the nature of first truths, and cannot be denied 
without, at the same time, admitting the point in 
dispute. 



TESTIMONIALS. 

The following testimonials were received several years 
ago, but they have strict reference to this work. 

From Rev. Dr. Skinner. 

Mr. Harrington's mode of argumentation is very thorough 
and exact ; his style is uncommonly lucid and simple ; and 
there are no subjects of greater importance than those to 
which he applies his powerful and demonstrative logic. I 
earnestly desire that his lectures may be examined by 
good judges of doctrine and reasoning. I think they will 
abide the severest test of criticism. 

THOMAS H. SKINNER. 

New York, October 1st, 1849. 



From Dr. Asa D. Smith. 
From what attention I have been able to give to Mr. 
Harrington's Lectures, I concur most fully with the Rev. 
Dr. Skinner in his estimate of them. It strikes me that 
his views on some important subjects, would, if made pub- 
lic, not in lectures merely, but in some more permanent 
form, be generally regarded as a valuable contribution to 
theological science. ASA D. SMITH. 



New York, October 2d, 1849. 
I have examined the plan of the Rev. Mr. Harrington's 
Lectures, and somewhat in detail, the powerful and con- 
clusive reasoning of one of the lectures ; and most cheer- 
fully concur in the high opinion expressed of their value 
by the Rev. Dr. Skinner. J. DOWLING. 



From the Rev. Dr. Dowling. 
I have had the pleasure of listening to the lecture of 
my friend, the Rev. Isaac Harrington, upon Materialism, 
which is the first of a course of lectures on Infidelity, 
prepared by him. The lecture was delivered to a large 
and intelligent congregation in my church, last Lord's day 
evening, and was listened to with evident pleasure and 
interest. The lecture, though terse, rigid in argument, 



and a chain of connected thought from beginning to end, 
is yet well adapted to instruct and to interest an intelligent 
popular audience. I have no hesitation in saying that the 
lecture was one of the best that I have ever heard or read 
on the subject ; and if the first is a fair specimen of the 
rest, I should think the course would be highly valuable 
and instructive, whether presented from the pulpit or the 
press. J. DOWLING, 

Pastor of Bedford St. Baptist Church. 
New York City, October 8th, 1849. 

To the Friends of the Saviour : 

It gives me great pleasure to introduce to your fraternal 
notice and affection, the bearer, Mr. Isaac Harrington, a 
member of my church, and a Licentiate of the Presbytery 
of the North River. Pie is a devoted christian, and an 
able defender of the word of God. His lectures on Infi- 
delity are the very best I have ever heard. I hope he 
may have frequent opportunities to deliver them. 

H. G. LUDLOW. 



Poughkeepsie, October 10th, 1849. 
I have listened to Mr. Harrington's lecture upon Mate- 
rialism, as well as to his arguments on several other 
important points connected with the truths which he pro- 
poses to establish ; and have received from him a state- 
ment of the general plan of a work which he is preparing. 
The method proposed by Mr. H. seems to me to be good ; 
and the arguments perfectly clear and conclusive. I think 
there is a demand for just such a work as he purposes to 
publish, and that its publication at this time, would be 
productive of great good to the cause of Christianity. 
From an acquaintance of several years with Mr. Harring- 
ton, and with his logical mind, I have the fullest confi- 
dence in his ability to render it an interesting and valuable 
work. L. F. WALDO, 

Pastor of First Cong. Church, Poughkeepsie, N. Y. 



I have listened with great interest to Mr. Harrington's 
reasonings upon the Moral Axioms, and upon the reliable- 



3 

ness of the teachings of consciousness, as the foundation 
of all reasoning processes, and of all knowledge. His 
demonstrations appear to me to be entirely clear and con- 
clusive ; and will, I think, be of great service, not only to 
the cause of Christianity, but of Mental Science, in set- 
tling the long contested questions respecting First Truths. 

L. F. WALDO. 
Poughkeepsie, March 6th, 1850. 



From the JRev. J. Hyatt Smith. 

Poughkeepsie, September 11th, 1849. 
The bearer of this letter, Isaac Harrington, a Minister 
of the Gospel, in the Presbyterian Church, is a much 
esteemed brother in Christ. I am told that during his 
temporary absence from our village, he intends delivering 
his course of lectures on Infidelity. I believe him to be 
truly able, by sound doctrine, both to exhort and to convince 
the gainsayers — confident that he is a workman appointed 
unto God, that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly divid- 
ing the word of truth. Identified with him in heart, and 
. in feeling, any kindness rendered him would be a favor 
conferred upon his friend and brother in Christ. 

J. HYATT SMITH. 



The bearer of this letter, Mr. Isaac Harrington, is a 
Licensed Preacher of the Gospel in the Presbyterian 
Church in this village. I have had the pleasure of asso- 
ciating with Mr. Harrington for some time past, and also 
of hearing a part of his lectures on Infidelity ; and cheer- 
fully commend him to the favorable regard of my brethren 
in the ministry. GEORGE F. KETTELL, 

Pastor of Second Methodist Episcopal Church. 

Poughkeepsie, September 16th, 1849. 



Poughkeepsie, December 14th, 1849. 
I have listened to the reading of some portions of Mr. 
Harrington's work on Infidelity, and cheerfully commend 
it as a work of great merit and importance. Mr. Harring- 
ton's arguments are forcible and conclusive, and in my 
opinion overthrow entirely the strongest positions of the 



Infidel. As a text-book for the young I think it eminently 
adapted to subserve the interests of Christianity. 
GEORGE F. KETTELL, 
Pastor of Second Methodist Episcopal Church. 

From Prof. Samuel F. B. Morse. 
I have listened to the reading of a portion of Rev. Mr. 
Harrington's arguments, and cordially agree with the dis- 
tinguished gentlemen who have expressed their opinions, 
that they are logical in an eminent degree, and calculated 
to be useful, so far as reasoning is concerned, in breaking 
down the infidelity of the natural heart. 

SAMUEL F. B. MORSE. 
Locust Grove, January 3d, 1850. 



From the New York Tribune. 
Lectures on Infidelity. — An able and argumentative 
lecture, preparatory to a more extensive course on the 
subject, was delivered last night, by Rev. Mr. Harrington, 
at the Baptist Church corner Sixteenth Street and Eighth 
Avenue, (Rev. Mr. Taggart's,) to a deeply interested audi- 
ence. The lecturer considered the subject, in reference to 
the Atheism which is founded on a materialistic philoso- 
phy, and by a very ingenious and lucid analysis, demol- 
ished the first principles of the system. He commenced 
his argument with showing the necessity of an eternal 
existence from the fact of an actual existence ; he then 
demonstrated the impossibility of destroying this exist- 
ence ; and finally proved, by an acute and logical compar- 
ison of the qualities of mind and matter, that the First 
Cause must be intelligent and spiritual. The lecture was 
distinguished by the closeness of its reasoning, the vigor 
and originality of its illustrations, and the happy adapta- 
tion of rigid and connected argument to a popular audience. 
It was also remarkable for its freedom from vituperative 
epithets toward the persons whose opinions it so earnestly 
combated, and its reliance on the force of evidence rather 
than the severity of invective. We trust that the inter- 
esting course, of which this lecture forms a part, will be 
delivered where all will have an opportunity of listening 
to the powerful statements of the interesting speaker. 



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